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INFINITE ARBITRATION CLAUSES

DAVID HORTON†
For decades, the Supreme Court has expanded the Federal Arbitration Act
(FAA) and companies have placed arbitration clauses in hundreds of millions of
contracts. This Article examines a less-obvious way in which arbitration’s tendrils
are growing. Once, even the broadest arbitration provisions only governed
allegations that were somehow connected to the agreement between the parties (the
“container contract”). As a result, they often did not cover shocking and
unforeseeable misconduct, or parties who did not sign the container contract, or
claims that arose after the agreement lapsed. But now businesses are experimenting
with what this Article calls “infinite” arbitration clauses: those that mandate
arbitration for all disputes between any related party in perpetuity. Moreover, to cut
courts out of the loop, drafters are coupling infinite provisions with so-called
“delegation” clauses, which give the arbitrator the exclusive right to determine
whether to send a cause of action to arbitration.
The Article reveals that courts are divided about whether to take infinite
provisions literally. At first, most judges refused to allow companies to compel
arbitration in such broad strokes. Yet the Court has recently decided a rash of cases
that imply that the FAA overrides judicial hostility to boundless arbitration
provisions. Thus, infinite clauses are caught in a tug-of-war between state contract
rules that protect individuals from overreaching and the Justices’ view that the FAA
makes arbitration agreements bulletproof.
To resolve this conflict, the Article offers a theory about the limits of corporate
power to opt out of the judicial system. First, it argues that some infinite provisions
are not valid because they attempt to impose arbitration on plaintiffs who did not
truly agree to the process. Second, it contends that even when a plaintiff did agree
to arbitrate, the robust federal policy in favor of arbitration does not apply to lawsuits
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that have no logical relationship to the container contract. Finally, the Article uses
these insights to propose solutions to the numerous problems raised by ultra-broad
arbitration clauses.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2012, Diana Mey added her name to her husband’s AT&T Mobility
wireless account.1 To complete the transaction, she signed Mobility’s
Customer Agreement on an electronic pad at the cashier’s counter.2
Mobility’s ﬁne print contained an arbitration clause that applied to “all
disputes” between Mey and Mobility’s “subsidiaries, aﬃliates, agents,
employees, predecessors in interest, successors, and assigns.”3
Three years later, AT&T, Inc., Mobility’s parent company, acquired
DIRECTV Group Holdings, DIRECTV’s parent company.4 Thus, Mobility
and DIRECTV became “corporate cousins at least seven times removed.”5
In 2017, DIRECTV made obnoxious telemarketing calls to Mey’s cell
phone.6 Mey, whose number was on the Do Not Call Registry, sued DIRECTV
for violating the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA).7 DIRECTV
1 Brief of Appellee at 5, Mey v. DIRECTV, LLC, No. 18-1534 (4th Cir. Aug. 20, 2018), 2018
WL 4098110 [hereinafter Mey Appellee’s Brief].
2 Id. at 1, 5.
3 Corrected Opening Brief of Defendant-Appellant DIRECTV, LLC at 7, Mey, No. 18-1534
(4th Cir. July 19, 2018), 2018 WL 3610508 [hereinafter Mey Opening Brief] (emphasis omitted).
4 Mey Appellee’s Brief, supra note 1, at 6.
5 Id.
6 Id. at 1.
7 Id.
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responded by moving to compel arbitration.8 DIRECTV did not contend that
Mey had ever been a DIRECTV customer or that there was any agreement
between itself and Mey.9 Instead, DIRECTV argued that because it was an
“affiliate” of Mobility, it was entitled to invoke the arbitration provision in the
contract that Mey had formed with Mobility in 2012.10
Figure 1: AT&T’s Corporate Structure11

*

*

*

Michelle Haasbroek was a skincare specialist for Steiner Transocean in the
spa on board a cruise ship.12 One night, when Haasbroek was off-duty, she was
raped and impregnated by a coworker.13 Haasbroek sued Steiner for failing to
insure her safety, for mistreating her after she reported the incident, and for
wrongful birth.14 The company sought to enforce the arbitration clause in her
8 See Mey v. DIRECTV, LLC, No. 17-00179, 2018 WL 7823097, at *1 (N.D. W. Va. Apr. 25,
2018) (denying a motion to compel arbitration and to stay litigation).
9 Mey Opening Brief, supra note 3, at 13-14.
10 Id.
11 Mey Appellee’s Brief, supra note 1, at 7.
12 Haasbroek v. Princess Cruise Lines, Ltd., 286 F. Supp. 3d 1352, 1354 (S.D. Fla. 2017).
13 Id. at 1355, 1358.
14 Id.
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employment contract.15 As Steiner noted, even though Haasbroek’s allegations
were disturbing, she had agreed to arbitrate “[a]ny and all disputes, claims or
controversies whatsoever . . . [including] failure to provide prompt, proper
and adequate medical care, personal injury, [or] death.”16
*

*

*

In March 2012, Kaylee Heﬀelﬁnger opened a checking and a savings
account with Wells Fargo Bank.17 She ﬁlled out and signed an application.18

Unbeknownst to Heﬀelﬁnger, she was already a Wells Fargo customer.19
Three months earlier, before she had ever contacted the bank, its employees
had forged her signature on the paperwork for two phantom accounts.20

Then, in October 2012, Wells Fargo personnel created two more bogus
accounts in her name.21 This time, the application contained no signature at all.22
Id. at 1356.
Id. at 1355.
Consolidated Amended Complaint Class Action ¶ 64, Jabarri v. Wells Fargo & Co., 2015
WL 13699809 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2015) (No. 15-02159) [hereinafter Class Action Complaint].
18 Id.
19 Id. ¶ 65.
20 Id.
21 Id. ¶ 66.
22 Id.
15
16
17
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Over the next two years, these sham accounts began to accrue unpaid
fees.23 By the time Heﬀelﬁnger discovered the fraud, collection agencies were
hounding her and her credit score had been ruined.24
Heﬀelﬁnger’s experience was not unique. In 2016, Wells Fargo admitted
that its employees had generated 3,500,000 fake accounts in the names of
more than 2,000,000 real people.25 The institution faced a torrent of criticism
and scrutiny from lawmakers,26 consumer watchdogs,27 and journalists.28 It
pushed out its CEO,29 entered into a $105 million consent decree with the

Id. ¶¶ 67-69.
Id. ¶¶ 68, 78.
See Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., CFPB No. 2016-CFPB-0015, 2016 WL 6646128, ¶¶ 16, 23 (Sept. 4,
2016) (estimating that the bank had opened 1,534,280 counterfeit deposit accounts and issued 565,443
phantom credit cards); Emily Glazer, Wells Fargo’s Sales-Scandal Tally Grows to Around 3.5 Million Accounts,
WALL ST. J. (Aug. 31, 2017, 6:59 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/wells-fargos-sales-scandal-tallygrows-to-around-3-5-million-accounts-1504184598 [https://perma.cc/BH4F-QCHC] (noting that the
bank later conceded that the “scandal was far broader than it had previously acknowledged”).
26 See, e.g., Renae Merle, Warren to Wells Fargo CEO: ‘You Should Be Fired,’ WASH. POST (Oct. 3,
2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/business/wp/2017/10/03/ceo-to-congress-wells-fargo-isbetter-bank-today-than-it-was-a-year-ago/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.8df449423c7b [https://perma.
cc/H8NR-833N] (describing heated exchanges between Wells Fargo’s then-chief executive, Timothy
Sloan, and members of the Senate Banking Committee).
27 See, e.g., Gretchen Morgenson, Wells Fargo’s Testimony Left Some Feeling Shortchanged, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 31, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/31/business/wells-fargo-testimony.html
[https://perma.cc/V97G-QQTV] (“Led by Americans for Financial Reform and Public
Citizen . . . the groups sent a letter late Thursday to leadership of the Senate Banking Committee
and the House Financial Services Committee urging them to bring Wells Fargo executives back to
Capitol Hill to answer questions about the bank’s stream of abuses.”).
28 See Emily Glazer et al., Wells Fargo Is Trying to Fix Its Rogue Account Scandal, One Grueling
Case at a Time, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 27, 2016, 11:24 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/wells-fargo-istrying-to-ﬁx-its-rogue-account-scandal-one-grueling-case-at-a-time-1482855852 [https://perma.cc/
Y9Y8-M9ZL] (proﬁling widespread frustrations with Wells Fargo’s cleanup process following the
account scandal).
29 See Matt Egan, Jackie Wattles & Cristina Alesci, Wells Fargo CEO John Stumpf is Out, CNN
(Oct. 12, 2016, 7:31 PM), https://money.cnn.com/2016/10/12/investing/wells-fargo-ceo-john-stumpfretires/index.html [https://perma.cc/78XM-YUV3] (“Stumpf made the decision to retire, which was
welcomed by the board.”).
23
24
25
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Consumer Financial Protection Bureau,30 and agreed to pay a total of $575
million in ﬁnes to states.31
But because Wells Fargo’s remedial eﬀorts did not make all of its
customers whole, Heﬀelﬁnger ﬁled a class action in federal court.32 Here the
bank had an ace up its sleeve. When Heﬀelﬁnger had applied for her
legitimate accounts in March 2012, she had agreed to the bank’s Consumer
Account Agreement.33 This contract mandated arbitration for “any
unresolved disagreement between you and the Bank,” including those “about
the meaning, application or enforceability of this arbitration agreement.”34
Citing this language, Wells Fargo did not just argue that Heﬀelﬁnger had
agreed to arbitrate the merits of her lawsuit; rather, the ﬁrm contended that
Heﬀelﬁnger had agreed to arbitrate the very question of whether she had
agreed to arbitrate the merits of her lawsuit.35
*

*

*

Forced arbitration is a hallmark of the modern American civil justice
system. In 1925, Congress passed the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) to
abolish ancient rules that made predispute arbitration clauses
unenforceable.36 In the 1980s, the Supreme Court dramatically expanded the
statute, provoking debate about whether private dispute resolution was an
elegant alternative to the pathologies of litigation37 or “do-it-yourself tort
30 See Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., CFPB No. 2016-CFPB-0015, 2016 WL 6646128, at ¶¶ 49, 57
(Sept. 4, 2016) (requiring that Wells Fargo pay $5 million in “redress to [a]ﬀected [c]onsumers” and
$100 million directly to the Bureau as a “civil money penalty”).
31 Annalyn Kurtz, Wells Fargo is Paying $575 Million to States to Settle Fake Account Claims, CNN
BUSINESS (Dec. 28, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/12/28/business/wells-fargo-settlement/
index.html [https://perma.cc/82AW-RW9D].
32 Class Action Complaint, supra note 17, at ¶¶ 84, 92-142.
33 Defendants’ Notice of Motion and Motion to Compel Arbitration of Plaintiﬀ Kaylee
Heﬀelﬁnger’s Claims at 1, Jabbari v. Wells Fargo & Co., 2015 WL 13699809 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 23,
2015) (No. 15-02159) [hereinafter “Heﬀelﬁnger Motion to Compel”].
34 Id. at 3. (internal quotation marks omitted).
35 Id. at 7-8.
36 See Federal Arbitration Act, Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codiﬁed as amended at
9 U.S.C. §§ 1–14 (2018)) (making arbitration agreements valid and enforceable in federal court);
H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 1-2 (1924) (noting that the FAA was intended to overcome “the
[anachronistic] jealousy of the . . . courts” that “refused to enforce speciﬁc agreements to
arbitrate . . .”); Sales and Contracts to Sell in Interstate and Foreign Commerce, and Federal Commercial
Arbitration: Hearing on S. 4213 and S. 4214 before a Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 67th
Cong. 2 (1923) [hereinafter Senate Hearings] (statement of Charles L. Bernheimer, Chairman,
Arbitration Committee, New York Chamber of Commerce) (“The fundamental conception
underlying the law is to make arbitration agreements valid, irrevocable, and enforceable.”).
37 See, e.g., Steven A. Meyerowitz, The Arbitration Alternative, ABA J., Feb. 1985, at 78, 79
(explaining that arbitration proponents believe that it is “faster, less costly and more private,
informal and conﬁdential than litigation . . .”).
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reform.”38 Since 2010, the Justices have gone further, issuing a rash of
opinions that have encouraged businesses to use arbitration as a shield against
class actions.39 Not surprisingly, studies have found arbitration clauses in
millions of consumer and employment contracts.40
This Article identiﬁes a subtler way in which arbitration’s shadow is
growing. Traditionally, companies only attempted to mandate arbitration of
disputes that were connected to the contract that included the arbitration
provision (the “container contract”). Thus, until recently, even the broadest
arbitration clause only applied to “any controversy or claim . . . arising out of
or relating to this agreement.”41 Now, however, drafters have become more
ambitious. In rising numbers, they have started to experiment with what I
call “inﬁnite” arbitration agreements.
Inﬁnite arbitration clauses exhibit one or more of the following
characteristics. First, they are “not limited to disputes arising from or related
to the transaction or contract at issue.”42 For instance, Wells Fargo’s customers
agree to arbitrate “[a]ny unresolved disagreement,”43 and Steiner’s arbitration
clause covers “all disputes, claims or controversies whatsoever.”44 Thus,
inﬁnite provisions attempt to govern conduct that has nothing to do with the
original transaction, such as sexual harassment after the purchase of
household goods45 or “a punch in the nose during a dispute over medical
Ragan v. AT & T Corp., 824 N.E.2d 1183, 1193 n.1 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005).
See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 352 (2011) (holding that the FAA
preempts a state rule that deemed most class arbitration waivers in consumer contracts to be
unconscionable); see also, e.g., Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1632 (2018) (reversing the
National Labor Relations Board’s decision outlawing class arbitration waivers in employment
contracts); Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 238-39 (2013) (extending
Concepcion to a similar federal common law rule that often invalidated class arbitration waivers).
40 See, e.g., CFPB Study Finds That Arbitration Agreements Limit Relief for Consumers, CONSUMER
FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU (Mar. 10, 2015), https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201503_cfpb_factsheet_
arbitration-study.pdf [https://perma.cc/J7CT-HJ52] (reporting that “tens of millions of consumers are
covered by arbitration clauses”); Alexander J.S. Colvin, Access to the Courts is Now Barred for More than 60
Million American Workers, ECON. POL’Y INST. (Apr. 6, 2018), https://www.epi.org/publication/thegrowing-use-of-mandatory-arbitration-access-to-the-courts-is-now-barred-for-more-than-60-millionamerican-workers/ [https://perma.cc/YW7W-CPTN] (estimating that 60.1 million American workers
are subject to mandatory employment arbitration procedures).
41 Mehler v. Terminix Int’l Co., No. 397-2390, 1998 WL 893149, at *7 (D. Conn. Sept. 28,
1998) (referring to such a provision as “the paradigm of a broad arbitration clause”), rev’d, 205 F.3d
44 (2d Cir. 2000).
42 In re Jiﬀy Lube Int’l, Inc., Text Spam Litig., 847 F. Supp. 2d 1253, 1262 (S.D. Cal. 2012).
43 Heﬀelﬁnger Motion to Compel, supra note 33, at 3 (emphasis added).
44 Haasbroek v. Princess Cruise Lines, Ltd., 286 F. Supp. 3d 1352, 1355 (S.D. Fla. 2017)
(emphasis added).
45 See Parm v. Bluestem Brands, Inc., No. 15-3437, 2017 WL 1193993, at *9 n.20 (D. Minn. Mar.
30, 2017) (theorizing that a bank’s arbitration agreement for credit account holders would not apply
to an instance of sexual harassment between employees even if one of the employees was a credit
account holder of the same bank), rev’d and remanded, 898 F.3d 869 (8th Cir. 2018).
38
39
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billing.”46 Second, inﬁnite clauses extend beyond the original contractual
partners. Like Mobility’s Customer Agreement—which applies to the parties’
“subsidiaries, aﬃliates, agents, employees, predecessors in interest,
successors, and assigns, as well as all authorized or unauthorized users”—
inﬁnite clauses govern all persons or entities with a connection to the
container contract.47 Third, inﬁnite provisions have no sunset date. Although
the common law condemns perpetual contracts, inﬁnite clauses “survive the
closing of [an] account or termination of any service.”48 Finally, inﬁnite
clauses often appear alongside what the Supreme Court has dubbed
“delegation clauses”: terms that give the arbitrator the exclusive right to
decide gateway questions of “arbitrability” (whether a claim must be
submitted to arbitration). That is, under contracts like Wells Fargo’s, a
plaintiﬀ must participate in the arbitration process in order to argue that her
complaint falls outside the boundaries of the arbitration clause.49 Inﬁnite
clauses stretch to the horizon and last forever. They are less a contractual
provision and more a kind of arbitration servitude.
The Article begins by exploring the roots of this phenomenon. It reveals
that inﬁnite provisions are the byproduct of a neglected area of doctrinal
confusion. Although no law review article has addressed the topic,50 courts
have long struggled with “scope arbitrability”: whether an arbitration clause
applies to a speciﬁc claim.51 To be sure, the classic “broad” arbitration

46 Med. Staﬀ of Doctors Med. Ctr. v. Kamil, 33 Cal. Rptr. 3d 853, 857 (Ct. App. 2005)
(reasoning that, much like a physical assault in a billing dispute, an arbitration agreement covering
medical care would not extend to deliberate destruction of physicians’ professional relationships).
47 Wireless Customer Agreement, AT&T, https://www.att.com/legal/terms.wirelessCustomer
Agreement.html#disputeResolutionByBindingArb [https://perma.cc/DY8T-XWKT] (last visited
Jan. 2, 2020).
48 WELLS FARGO, DEPOSIT ACCOUNT AGREEMENT 8 (2019), https://www.wellsfargo.com/
fetch-pdf?formNumber=CCB2018C&subProductCode=ANY [https://perma.cc/H3CG-6F8X].
49 Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 68 (2010).
50 Cf. Stephen E. Friedman, The Lost Controversy Limitation of the Federal Arbitration Act, 46
U. RICH. L. REV. 1005 (2012). Friedman’s excellent but overlooked article argues that broad
arbitration clauses (which govern claims that “arise out of or relate to” the container contract)
exceed the scope of the FAA (which only covers allegations that “aris[e] out of ” the underlying
agreement). Id. at 1006. As will become apparent in Section II.A, my thesis builds on Friedman’s
insight. However, my Article differs from Friedman’s in several important ways. First, and most
importantly, Friedman does not address infinite arbitration clauses. Second, Friedman simply
assumes that courts “invariably enforce . . . broad [arbitration] provisions.” Id. at 1007. Conversely,
I show that the law is not nearly so clear. Third, Friedman uses his descriptive argument to claim
that the FAA “appl[ies] only to the arbitration of contract disputes.” Id. at 1037. In contrast, I
contend that the statute does not impose any bright-line requirements on the kinds of causes of
action that can be arbitrated; rather, it merely insists that an allegation have a nexus with the
container contract. See infra Section II.B.
51 King v. Cintas Corp., 920 F. Supp. 2d 1263, 1267 (N.D. Ala. 2013) (“[C]ourts have not
provided uniﬁed authority on the scope of arbitration clauses.”).
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provision casts a wide net.52 If a plaintiﬀ sues for breach of contract, wrongful
ﬁring, employment discrimination, or violation of consumer protection laws,
her allegations “arise out of or relate to” the container contract and therefore
trigger its arbitration agreement.53 However, in other cases, the link between
the complaint and the container contract is less clear. As the Tenth Circuit
once mused, what if “two small business owners execute a sales contract
including a[n] . . . arbitration clause, and one assaults the other”?54 Because
of the mutability of phrases like “arise out of ” and “relate to,” there is no easy
answer. Compounding this problem, scope arbitrability occupies “a gray space
of overlapping federal arbitration and state contract law.”55 Although the
Court has declared that arbitration clauses must be “generously construed as
to issues of arbitrability,”56 contract doctrine cuts the other way by nullifying
unconscionable terms, vindicating an individual’s reasonable expectations,
and construing ambiguities against the drafter.57 Thus, courts disagree about
whether to compel arbitration of claims that seek relief for shocking
misconduct, or that are ﬁled by or against nonsignatories, or that are brought
after the container contract has lapsed.58 In turn, corporations have
engineered inﬁnite provisions to try to ﬁll these gaps.
Inﬁnite clauses have further divided the few judges that have confronted
them. Although there is “almost no case law addressing such broad arbitration
clauses,”59 some courts view them skeptically. For example, in Diane Mey’s
lawsuit, a federal judge in West Virginia refused to allow DIRECTV to
piggyback on Mobility’s arbitration clause.60 The court explained that reading
the provision literally could spawn absurd results:
If [the plaintiff] were hit by a Mobility delivery van, or if she tripped over a
dangerous condition in a Mobility store, her tort claim would have to go to
arbitration. If she bought shares of stock in Mobility and later claimed a decrease
in share price was the result of corporate malfeasance, her securities-fraud claim
would have to go to arbitration. And since the arbitration clause purports to
survive termination of the underlying service agreement, this obligation to
arbitrate any claim whatsoever against Mobility would last forever.61

52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61

See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
See infra text accompanying notes 142–144.
Coors Brewing Co. v. Molson Breweries, 51 F.3d 1511, 1516 (10th Cir. 1995).
Mitchell v. Wells Fargo Bank, 280 F. Supp. 3d 1261, 1279 (D. Utah 2017).
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626 (1985).
See infra text accompanying notes 123–127.
See generally infra text accompanying notes 144–168.
Wexler v. AT & T Corp., 211 F. Supp. 3d 500, 502 (E.D.N.Y. 2016).
Mey v. DIRECTV, LLC, No. 17-00179, 2018 WL 7823097, at *5 (N.D. W. Va. Apr. 25, 2018).
Id. at *6 (citing Wexler, 211 F. Supp. 3d at 502-03).
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Accordingly, the court held that the language was “unconscionably
overbroad.”62 In the same vein, other courts have refused to apply inﬁnite
provisions to unforeseeable and outrageous conduct.63
But this jaundiced view of infinite clauses is hard to square with the Court’s
recent FAA decisions. These opinions admonish lower courts to “‘rigorously
enforce’ arbitration agreements according to their terms”64 and to ignore any
rule that “discriminat[es] on its face against arbitration.”65 Taking these
instructions to heart, some judges have held that there is nothing sinister about
a “clause that requires arbitration of all disputes between the parties.”66 For
instance, a federal judge in Florida compelled arbitration of Michelle
Haasbroek’s sexual assault claims.67 Haasbroek asserted that her allegations
were unrelated to her employment contract because the attack occurred while
“she was off-duty and in a residential area of the ship.”68 Yet because the
arbitration provision extended beyond “claims arising from, or relating to,
employment,” the court held that this argument was “irrelevant.”69
Meanwhile, the spread of delegation clauses is further muddying the
waters. Together, delegation provisions and inﬁnite arbitration clauses almost
completely strip courts of jurisdiction over a company. Consider the fate of
Heﬀelﬁnger’s class action against Wells Fargo. A federal judge in California
expressed doubts that the bank’s arbitration clause governed Heﬀelﬁnger’s
allegations relating to the forged January 2012 accounts.70 As the court noted,
because Heﬀelﬁnger did not open a legitimate account until March 2012, these
claims “may have arisen before she had any voluntary involvement with Wells
Fargo.”71 Yet citing the delegation clause, the judge held that the arbitrator

Id.
See, e.g., Aiken v. World Fin. Corp. of S.C., 644 S.E.2d 705, 709 (S.C. 2007); cf. McBride v. St.
Anthony Messenger Magazine, No. 02-237, 2003 WL 1903381, at *10 (S.D. Ind. Feb. 6, 2003) (opining
that, in general, “it may be unreasonable to understand the parties as intending that any dispute that
may arise between them even if unrelated to the Agreement would be subject to arbitration”).
64 Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 233 (2013).
65 Kindred Nursing Ctrs. Ltd. P’ship v. Clark, 137 S. Ct. 1421, 1426 (2017).
66 Citi Cars, Inc. v. Cox Enters., Inc., No. 17-22190, 2018 WL 1521770, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 22,
2018) (quoting Bd. of Trs. of City of Delray Beach Police & Fireﬁghters Ret. Sys. v. Citigroup Glob.
Mkts., Inc., 622 F.3d 1335, 1343 (11th Cir. 2010)).
67 Haasbroek v. Princess Cruise Lines, Ltd., 286 F. Supp. 3d 1352, 1360 (S.D. Fla. 2017).
68 Id. at 1358.
69 Id. at 1360 n.8.
70 See Jabbari v. Wells Fargo & Co., No. 15-02159, 2015 WL 13699809, at *2-3 (N.D. Cal. Sept.
23, 2015) (in an order granting defendants’ motion to compel arbitration, noting that the issue is a
“close question” and that “it’s diﬃcult to imagine that this aspect of the dispute would be subject to
the arbitration provision”).
71 Id. at *3.
62
63
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should decide whether Heﬀelﬁnger’s allegations fell within the scope of the
arbitration provision.72
Against this backdrop, the Article oﬀers a descriptive and normative
theory about the limits of inﬁnite clauses. It identiﬁes two situations in which
judges can ignore extraordinarily broad arbitration provisions. First, some
inﬁnite clauses fail because they try to create contractual consent out of whole
cloth. For example, drafters often declare that their arbitration provisions
beneﬁt and bind a range of nonsignatories, from their litigation allies to the
plaintiﬀ ’s relatives to anyone who uses a particular product or service.73 But
absent unusual circumstances, these people and entities have nothing to do
with the container contract. Accordingly, no matter what an arbitration clause
says, “federal law does not force arbitration upon a party that never agreed to
arbitrate in the ﬁrst place.”74
Second, the Article argues that another check on inﬁnite clauses is hiding
in plain sight. Section 2, the FAA’s centerpiece, instructs courts to enforce a
provision “in any . . . contract . . . to settle by arbitration a controversy
thereafter arising out of such contract.”75 Thus, the statute imposes what I call the
“contractual nexus” requirement: it only governs disputes that are tied to in
some meaningful way to the parties’ agreement.
This boundary was no accident. Congress modeled the FAA on New York’s
pioneering 1920 arbitration statute.76 However, New York’s version of § 2
applied across the board to any lawsuit “arising between the parties to the
contract.”77 In contrast, federal lawmakers chose to narrow the FAA to cases
that were tethered to the container contract. Likewise, one draft of the FAA
applied to any controversies that were merely grounded in the parties’ general
“transaction[s].”78 Yet Congress ultimately deleted this phrase, reinforcing the
necessity of a contractual nexus.79 Therefore, because the FAA’s vigorous proarbitration policies often do not apply to ultra-broad arbitration clauses, courts
can continue to find that they are unconscionable, construe them against the
drafter, or hold that they exceed a person’s reasonable expectations.
This thesis justiﬁes some opinions and might change the outcomes in
others. Recall DIRECTV’s attempt to freeride on Mobility’s contract in
72 See id. (holding that Wells Fargo’s argument that the dispute fell “within the scope of the
arbitration provision” was not “wholly groundless”).
73 See infra text accompanying notes 185–186.
74 Richmond Health Facilities v. Nichols, 811 F.3d 192, 201 (6th Cir. 2016).
75 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2018) (emphasis added).
76 See S. REP. NO. 68-536, at 3 (1924) (noting that the FAA “follows the lines of the New York
arbitration law enacted in 1920”).
77 In re Shima & Co., 186 N.Y.S. 154, 155 (Sup. Ct. 1920) (quoting Arbitration Law, ch. 275, § 2,
1920 N.Y. Laws 5, 8) (emphasis added).
78 Senate Hearings, supra note 36.
79 See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2018).
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Mey’s lawsuit.80 The problem with this gambit is that although Mey agreed
to arbitrate future claims against Mobility, she did not agree to arbitrate any
claims against DIRECTV. To be sure, the common law sometimes estops
plaintiﬀs from avoiding arbitration when they assert claims against
nonsignatories who are closely related to a signatory.81 But the basis of this
rule—that the plaintiﬀ must have understood that she was consenting to
arbitrate against these corporate siblings82—does not apply to two entities
that were rivals at the time of contracting. Accordingly, the West Virginia
federal court correctly held that DIRECTV could not enforce Mobility’s
clause.83 Conversely, the Florida judge in Michelle Haasbroek’s case should
have taken Haasbroek’s argument that her rape claims were unconnected to
her employment contract more seriously.84 If Haasbroek’s allegations did not
“aris[e] out of ” the container contract, then they did not fall within the scope
of § 2. As a result, the FAA did not apply, and the court was free to ﬁnd that
a clause cannot require arbitration for a lawsuit stemming from events outside
of a plaintiﬀ ’s employment.85
Finally, the Article’s proposals inform the intersection of inﬁnite
arbitration clauses and delegation provisions.86 These clauses are a potent
duo: one demands arbitration for any conceivable claim while the other sends
disputes about arbitration to arbitration. Moreover, in January 2019, the Court
decided Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White Sales, Inc., which further
insulated delegation clauses from judicial oversight.87 Henry Schein overruled
a line of precedent dating back to the 1950s that allowed courts to ignore
delegation clauses when a defendant’s assertion that a claim fell within the
scope of an arbitration agreement was “wholly groundless.”88 Nevertheless,
despite the Court’s opinion, the Article’s analysis elucidates that delegation

See supra text accompanying notes 1–11.
See infra text accompanying notes 318–324.
See infra text accompanying notes 326–327.
See supra text accompanying notes 60–62.
See supra text accompanying notes 67–69.
Cf. Arnold v. Burger King, 48 N.E.3d 69, 72-73 (Ohio Ct. App. 2015) (refusing to compel
arbitration of workplace rape claims in a situation analogous to Haasbroek’s because the claims were
outside the scope of the arbitration agreement).
86 This Article’s discussion of delegation clauses builds oﬀ of two previous pieces. First, I have
criticized the Court’s view that delegation provisions should be treated exactly like agreements to
arbitrate the merits of a dispute. See David Horton, Arbitration About Arbitration, 70 STAN. L. REV.
363, 413 (2018). Second, I have demonstrated that arbitrators are more likely than judges to interpret
arbitration clauses to permit class proceedings—a result that is troubling because it suggests that
arbitrators are guided by their ﬁnancial incentive to christen a long and lucrative dispute. See David
Horton, Clause Construction: A Glimpse into Judicial and Arbitral Decision-Making, 68 DUKE L.J. 1323,
1382 (2019).
87 139 S. Ct. 524, 528-29 (2019).
88 Id.; see also infra text accompanying notes 107–109.
80
81
82
83
84
85
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clauses have limits. Speciﬁcally, when a plaintiﬀ argues that she did not agree
to arbitrate or that the arbitration clause has expired, no amount of boilerplate
can assign this question to the arbitrator. Indeed, because arbitration draws
its legitimacy from the parties’ consent, allowing an arbitrator to decide
whether the parties consented (or whether their consent is still operational)
would be an illogical circle.
The Article contains two Parts. Part I provides background. It explains that
courts have struggled to decide whether certain lawsuits fall within the scope
of an arbitration clause. It then shows how businesses responded to this
doctrinal uncertainty by creating infinite provisions. Part II identifies two ways
in which courts can regulate infinite clauses. It asserts that infinite provisions
can neither produce contractual assent by ipse dixit nor govern disputes that are
unrelated to the container contract. Finally, it uses these insights to suggest
answers to the puzzles raised by ultra-broad arbitration agreements.
I. SCOPE WARS
This Part begins by revealing that judges disagree about how far
arbitration provisions can stretch. It then demonstrates that companies have
started trying to navigate around this doctrinal fog by dramatically expanding
their agreements to arbitrate. Finally, it describes the looming showdown
between the judges that have pushed back against inﬁnite clauses and the
Court’s muscular interpretation of the FAA.
A. Conventional Arbitration Clauses
“Scope arbitrability”—the question of whether a dispute falls within the
coverage of an arbitration clause—has long been “an issue about which courts
disagree.”89 This Section describes why the topic is so challenging.
The conventional story about the rise of the FAA begins with the
proposition that courts were once cynical about arbitration. As is well-known,
the common law contained special rules, known as the “ouster” and
“revocability” doctrines, which made it hard to obtain speciﬁc performance
of a predispute arbitration agreement.90 These measures reﬂected the fear

Jones v. Halliburton Co., 583 F.3d 228, 240 (5th Cir. 2009).
Under the ouster doctrine, judges refused to allow private parties to contract around a court’s
jurisdiction. See, e.g., Kill v. Hollister (1746) 95 Eng. Rep. 532 (KB) 532 (“[B]ut the agreement of the
parties cannot oust this Court.”). The revocability rule permitted a party to withdraw its assent to
arbitrate at any time before the arbitrator issued an award. See, e.g., Vynior’s Case (1609) 77 Eng.
Rep. 597 (KB) 597 (“Where a man is bound by bond to stand to, abide by, and perform . . . the award
of an arbitrator, he may countermand the authority of the arbitrator.”).
89
90
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that extrajudicial tribunals were “instrument[s] of injustice” that “deprive[d]
parties of rights.”91
Nevertheless, during this period, judges actually favored arbitration in one
way. Merchants and members of trade associations often submitted existing
disputes to arbitration.92 After the hearing, the losing party sometimes asked
a court to vacate the award on the grounds the arbitrator had “exceeded [her]
powers” by ruling on a matter that the parties had not agreed to arbitrate.93
Courts did not look kindly on these attempts to rekindle a dormant dispute.
Indeed, they required “the party complaining [to] clearly show that the
authority granted [under the agreement to arbitrate] has been exceeded.”94
As the North Carolina Supreme Court recognized in 1911, this approach
meant that the common law “put a[] liberal and comprehensive construction”
on contracts to arbitrate.95
In 1925, this practice became less anomalous when Congress passed the
FAA.96 Section 2 of the statute sweeps away the cobwebs of the common law
by making predispute arbitration clauses speciﬁcally enforceable:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy
thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction . . . shall be valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract.97

By doing so, lawmakers attempted to place arbitration clauses “upon the
same footing as other contracts.”98 But as commentators would eventually
91 Tobey v. Cty. of Bristol, 23 F. Cas. 1313, 1320-21 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 14,065). In
addition, arbitration may have been “seen as an economic threat to English judges, whose incomes
often depended on fees from disputants.” Richard C. Reuben, Public Justice: Toward a State Action
Theory of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 577, 600 (1997).
92 See, e.g., Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Rustic Justice: Community and Coercion Under the Federal
Arbitration Act, 77 N.C. L. REV. 931, 971-72 (1999) (noting that arbitration systems in the early
twentieth century in the United States typically “utilized a panel of arbitrators drawn from the trade
association’s membership and counseled the arbitrators to apply their knowledge of the trade to
bring about an equitable resolution to the dispute.” (footnotes omitted)).
93 Bethea v. Hood, 9 La. Ann. 88, 89 (1854).
94 Republic of Colombia v. Cauca Co., 106 F. 337, 349 (C.C.D. W. Va. 1901), aﬀ ’d, 113 F. 1020
(4th Cir. 1902), rev’d, 190 U.S. 524 (1903); cf. Leslie v. Leslie, 24 A. 319, 321 (N.J. Ch. 1892) (“[I]t
has become a settled principle of jurisprudence that awards are to be expounded favorably, and every
reasonable intendment made in their support.”).
95 Robertson & Creed v. Marshall, 71 S.E. 67, 68 (N.C. 1911); see also Bush v. Davis, 34 Mich.
190, 198 (1876) (“[T]he award shall be presumed within the submission unless the contrary expressly
appears.”); Hinkle v. Harris, 34 Mo. App. 223, 224 (Ct. App. 1889) (“The presumption is that the
arbitrators did not exceed the powers given them . . . .”).
96 See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-15 (2018).
97 Id. § 2.
98 H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 1 (1924).
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recognize, § 2’s mix of state and federal law “invite[s] trouble.”99 On one hand,
the FAA requires arbitration agreements to comply with rules that govern
“any contract,”100 and thus makes state law the touchstone for determining
arbitrability. On the other hand, the statute partially federalizes the same
issue by eclipsing any rule that resurrects the ouster and revocability doctrines
by expressing suspicion of arbitration.
Then, after the FAA’s enactment, three points crystallized about
interpreting arbitration provisions. First, even the broadest clause could not
cover the elementary question of whether the parties had consented to
arbitrate in the ﬁrst place.101 Because arbitration stems from agreement,
allowing arbitrators to rule on this issue would be a spectacular exercise in
bootstrapping. In addition, if an arbitrator determined that a litigant did not
assent to arbitrate, she would paradoxically undercut her own authority to
render any judgment at all.102
Second, when a plaintiﬀ argued that one of her claims fell outside the
ambit of the clause, the presumption was that courts, not arbitrators, resolved

99 Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, The Unconscionability Game: Strategic Judging and the Evolution of
Federal Arbitration Law, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1420, 1489 (2008).
100 See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2018) (“[A]n agreement . . . to submit to arbitration . . . shall be valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation
of any contract.”).
101 See Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 986 (2d Cir. 1942)
(“The [FAA] does not cover an arbitration agreement suﬃciently broad to include a controversy as
to the existence of the very contract which embodies the arbitration agreement.”). This point
requires some elaboration. Under what is known as the “separability doctrine,” every contract that
contains an arbitration provision is, in fact, two contracts: the container contract and the agreement
to arbitrate. See, e.g., Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 445 (2006). Thus,
when a party asserts a defense to enforcement of the container contract such as duress, she has not
challenged the enforceability of the arbitration provision, which kicks in and sends the claim to
arbitration. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 403-04 (1967)
(holding that if the container contract contains an arbitration clause, an arbitrator should decide a
party’s assertion that the container contract was induced by fraud). Although separability remains
hazy, it can be understood as a default rule that assumes that parties who have assented to a contract
containing an arbitration clause intend to have the arbitrator resolve all conﬂict between them,
including disputes over whether their seeming consent to the container contract is authentic. See
Alan Scott Rau, Everything You Really Need to Know About “Separability” in Seventeen Simple
Propositions, 14 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 1, 29 (2003). Yet because arbitration agreements cannot validate
themselves, this logic does not apply when a party argues that she never truly agreed to arbitrate. For
example, courts—not arbitrators—enjoy jurisdiction over issues such as (1) “[container] contract
formation,” Granite Rock Co. v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 561 U.S. 287, 296 (2010); (2) lack of mental
capacity, Spahr v. Secco, 330 F.3d 1266, 1273 (10th Cir. 2003); and (3) fraud in the factum (where a
party misled another about whether she was entering into a contract), Sightler v. Remington Coll.,
No. 15-273-37, 2015 WL 4459545, at *3 (M.D. Fla. July 21, 2015).
102 Cf. Kulukundis Shipping Co., 126 F.2d at 986 (“If the issue of the existence of the [container
contract] were left to the arbitrators and they found that it was never made, they would, unavoidably
(unless they were insane), be obliged to conclude that the arbitration agreement had never been made.”).
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the issue.103 In ﬁelds such as maritime and labor law, judges and scholars had
opined that it might be possible—as counterintuitive as it sounds—for
litigants to agree to arbitrate the issue of whether an arbitration clause applied
to a speciﬁc cause of action.104 This practice, which acquired the migraineinducing nickname of “arbitrating arbitrability,” capitalized on the fact that
arbitrators are often industry insiders and therefore can bring their expertise
to bear on the task of contract interpretation.105 Nevertheless, a contract
needed to be explicit in order to entrust scope arbitrability to the arbitrator.106
As the Court later explained, judges “should not assume that the parties
agreed to arbitrate arbitrability unless there is ‘clea[r] and unmistakabl[e]’
evidence that they did so.”107
Third, even when this “clear and unmistakable” test was satisﬁed, some
judges refused to allow arbitrators to hear claims of scope arbitrability that
were “wholly groundless.”108 Suppose an arbitration clause (1) exempted
intentional tort claims and also (2) empowered the arbitrator to decide
matters of scope arbitrability. If the plaintiﬀ then sued for intentional torts
and the defendant moved to compel arbitration, a judge might refuse to
submit the arbitrability question to arbitration.109 Doing so prevented the
103 Sections 3 and 4 of the FAA require courts to ensure that the parties entered into a valid
agreement to arbitrate that covers the plaintiﬀs’ claims. See 9 U.S.C. § 3 (2018) (allowing courts to
stay litigation pending the outcome of arbitration only if they are “satisﬁed” that the matter “is
referable to arbitration”); id. § 4 (tasking courts with resolving “issue[s]” about “the making of the
arbitration agreement”); see also AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 649
(1986) (“[W]hether or not the company was bound to arbitrate, as well as what issues it must
arbitrate, is a matter to be determined by the Court.” (quoting John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v.
Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 546-47 (1964)).
104 See Metal Prods. Workers Union, Local 1645 v. Torrington Co., 358 F.2d 103, 105 (2d Cir.
1966) (asserting that “the parties may voluntarily submit arbitrability to an arbitrator” where there
is a “clear demonstration” of the parties’ intent “to have an arbitrator decide arbitrability” (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted)); Eugene F. Scoles, Review of Labor Arbitration Awards on
Jurisdictional Grounds, 17 U. CHI. L. REV. 616, 623 (1950) (“[T]here appears no reason why the parties
may not submit the issue of arbitrability to arbitration.”).
105 See Local No. 149 of Am. Fed’n of Tech. Eng’rs (AFL) v. Gen. Elec. Co., 250 F.2d 922, 926
(1st Cir. 1957) (noting that in the context of the interpretation of collective bargaining agreements,
“an arbitrator has certain advantages over a court”).
106 See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigations Co., 363 U.S. 574, 583 n.7
(1960) (opining that a litigant must “clear[ly] demonstrat[e]” that a collective bargaining agreement
“excluded from court determination . . . the question of [the dispute’s] arbitrability”); Lehigh Coal
& Navigation Co. v. Cent. R.R. of N.J., 33 F. Supp. 362, 367 (E.D. Pa. 1940) (noting that the courts
“d[id] not readily infer such an agreement” (quoting WESLEY A. STURGES, COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATIONS AND AWARDS 144-45 (1930))).
107 First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995) (quoting AT&T Techs.,
Inc., 475 U.S. at 649).
108 McCarroll v. L.A. Cty. Dist. Council of Carpenters, 315 P.2d 322, 333 (Cal. 1957)
(addressing the court’s “threshold determination of arbitrability”).
109 Cf. Local 205, United Elec., Radio, & Mach. Workers of Am. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 233 F.2d
85, 101 (1st Cir. 1956) (requiring that “the applicant’s claim of arbitrability [not be] frivolous or
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parties from wasting their time arbitrating a frivolous assertion that a cause
of action fell within the scope of the arbitration agreement.110
But scope arbitrability became more complex near the end of the twentieth
century. Worried that the judiciary was buckling under the weight of the socalled “litigation explosion,”111 the Court began to expand the FAA. In
Southland v. Keating, the Justices held that § 2 of the statute preempts state
law.112 Shortly thereafter, the Court invalidated a Montana law that required
arbitration clauses to be conspicuous,113 California legislation that exempted
wage disputes from arbitration,114 and an Alabama rule that precluded specific
performance of an arbitration clause.115 The Court reasoned that because the
FAA sought to abolish hostility to arbitration, states can neither “singl[e] out
arbitration provisions for suspect status”116 nor pass “laws applicable only to
arbitration provisions.”117 Banks, credit card issuers, employers, retailers, and
service providers began to recognize the benefits of creating their own dispute
resolution schemes.118 Forced arbitration clauses became a routine part of
consumer and employment contracts, provoking heated debate about the
privatization of the justice system.119
patently baseless” before sending the issue of arbitrability to an arbitrator), aﬀ ’d on other grounds, 353
U.S. 547 (1957).
110 See Am. Stores Co. v. Johnston, 171 F. Supp. 275, 277 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (“When it appears
that a claim of arbitrability is frivolous or patently baseless it would . . . defeat the contractual intent
of the parties to compel arbitration.”).
111 Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don’t Know (and Think
We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4, 5-6 (1983)
(collecting assertions by commentators that American society has become more litigious).
112 465 U.S. 1, 8 (1984).
113 See Doctor’s Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996) (“Montana’s [statute] directly
conﬂicts with § 2 of the FAA because the State’s law conditions the enforceability of arbitration
agreements on compliance with a special notice requirement not applicable to contracts generally.
The FAA thus displaces the Montana statute . . . .”).
114 See Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 491 (1987) (“This clear federal policy places § 2 of the
Act in unmistakable conﬂict with California’s [statutory] requirement that litigants be provided a
judicial forum for resolving wage disputes. Therefore, under the Supremacy Clause, the state statute
must give way.”).
115 See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 272 (1995) (noting that “the Federal
Arbitration Act preempts state law” because “Congress would not have wanted state and federal
courts to reach diﬀerent outcomes about the validity of arbitration in similar cases”).
116 Doctor’s Assocs., 517 U.S. at 687.
117 Id.
118 Companies went to great lengths to try to foist arbitration upon both new and existing
customers. See, e.g., Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1148 (7th Cir. 1997) (featuring an
arbitration clause that was placed in a shipping container); Badie v. Bank of Am., 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d
273, 275 (Ct. App. 1998) (involving an arbitration clause in a monthly bill).
119 See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington & Paul H. Haagen, Contract and Jurisdiction, 1996 SUP. CT. REV.
331, 332 (1996) (criticizing the Court for going too far in an attempt to “conserve scarce judicial
resources by encouraging citizens to resolve disputes by private means”); Christopher R. Drahozal,
“Unfair” Arbitration Clauses, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 695, 698-99 (2001) (arguing that concern about one-
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These changes made § 2’s blend of federal and state law schizophrenic. The
Court announced that the FAA “establishes that, as a matter of federal law,
any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor
of arbitration.”120 For example, in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler ChryslerPlymouth, Inc., the Court held that an arbitration clause in an automobile
distribution agreement governed antitrust claims that did not arise directly
from the container contract.121 The Justices opined that when it came to
delineating the scope of an arbitration clause, “the parties’ intentions control,
but those intentions are generously construed as to issues of arbitrability.”122
Yet some lower courts pushed back. Determined to protect their own
jurisdiction, they reasoned that arbitration provisions ultimately “are
contracts, and, in interpreting such agreements, . . . courts are to apply state
contract law.”123 In turn, this maneuver allowed them to exempt claims from
arbitration by using an array of contract rules that “favor[] the underdog.”124
Scores of courts held that all or part of an arbitration clause was
unconscionable: offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, buried in a maze of text,
and unduly harsh.125 Likewise, judges drew on the doctrine of contra
proferentem and construed ambiguities in arbitration clauses against the
drafter.126 Finally, several courts held that consumers and employees “are not
bound to unknown terms which are beyond the range of reasonable

sided arbitration provisions is overblown); Samuel Estreicher, Saturns for Rickshaws: The Stakes in the
Debate over Predispute Employment Arbitration Agreements, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 559, 563
(2001) (contending that “[a] properly designed arbitration system . . . can do a better job of delivering
accessible justice for average claimants than a litigation-based approach”); David S. Schwartz,
Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled
Arbitration, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 33, 40 (1997) (decrying arbitration’s “potential for injustice”); Jean R.
Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court’s Preference for Binding Arbitration,
74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 638 (1996) (noting that arbitration clauses “may allow companies to select the
arbitrators, set the arbitration in a location convenient for the company but not for the little guy,
exclude certain recoveries such as punitive damages, shorten the statute of limitations, deny discovery
and other procedural protections, and eliminate virtually any right to appeal”).
120 Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983).
121 473 U.S. 614, 628-40 (1985) (likening arbitration clauses to forum selection provisions).
122 Id. at 626.
123 Fellows v. Bd. of Trs. of Welborn Clinic, 63 F. Supp. 2d 942, 944 (S.D. Ind. 1998).
124 5 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS 306 (Joseph M. Perillo ed., rev.
ed. 1998).
125 See, e.g., Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 692 (Cal. 2000)
(indicating that an arbitration agreement is unconscionable where it does not satisfy a “modicum of
bilaterality” of beneﬁts and burdens between the two parties).
126 See, e.g., Badie v. Bank of Am., 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 273, 287 (Ct. App. 1998) (“[I]f the
uncertainty is not removed by . . . other rules of interpretation, a contract must be interpreted most
strongly against the party who prepared it.”).
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expectation.”127 When arbitrability was on the table, the Court’s proclamations
pointed in one direction and contract principles steered in the other.128
The law has never figured out how to solve this conflict. For the past three
decades, judges have attacked questions of scope arbitrability by applying a
formalistic rubric that begins by classifying a provision as either “narrow” or
“broad.”129 Even this threshold step has sown division. In the Ninth Circuit
and, arguably, in the Second Circuit, a clause that merely requires arbitration
for disputes “arising under” the container contract is “narrow[].”130 In contrast,
the First, Third, Fourth, and Eleventh circuits treat the exact same language
as “broad.”131 Likewise, all jurisdictions agree that an agreement to arbitrate
claims “concerning” or “arising out of or relating to” a contract is “broad.”132
“Narrow” provisions, which are relatively rare, govern allegations
“relating to the interpretation and performance of the contract itself.”133
127 Broemmer v. Abortion Servs. of Phoenix, Ltd., 840 P.2d 1013, 1017 (Ariz. 1992) (quoting
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. f (AM. LAW INST. 1979)); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra, § 211 cmt. e (“Courts in construing and applying
a standardized contract seek to eﬀectuate the reasonable expectations of the average member of the
public who accepts it.”).
128 See, e.g., Caley v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp., 428 F.3d 1359, 1367-68 (11th Cir. 2005)
(“Thus, in determining whether a binding agreement arose between the parties, courts apply the
contract law of the particular state that governs the formation of contracts. The ‘federal policy
favoring arbitration, however, is taken into consideration even in applying ordinary state law.’”
(quoting Cooper v. MRM Inv. Co., 367 F.3d 493, 498 (6th Cir. 2004)). Compare Huﬀman v. Hilltop
Cos., 747 F.3d 391, 396-97 (6th Cir. 2014) (“[W]here ambiguity in agreements involving arbitration
exists, such as here, the strong presumption in favor of arbitration applies . . . .”), with Solis v. Evins,
951 S.W.2d 44, 51 (Tex. App. 1997) (holding, in the arbitration context, that “[w]e must, of course,
resolve uncertainties in favor of ” the nondrafting party).
129 Fleet Tire Serv. of N. Little Rock v. Oliver Rubber Co., 118 F.3d 619, 621 (8th Cir. 1997).
130 Cape Flattery Ltd. v. Titan Mar., LLC, 647 F.3d 914, 921 (9th Cir. 2011); see also Tracer Res.
Corp. v. Nat’l Envtl. Servs. Co., 42 F.3d 1292, 1295 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that “arising under” has
“limited scope”). In In re Kinoshita, 287 F.2d 951, 952-53 (2d Cir. 1961), the Second Circuit held that
a clause that governed “any dispute or diﬀerence [that] should arise under” the contract was “narrow.”
However, the Second Circuit has since backtracked from Kinoshita. See S.A. Mineracao Da
Trindade-Samitri v. Utah Int’l, Inc., 745 F.2d 190, 194 (2d Cir. 1984) (declining to overrule In re
Kinoshita but “conﬁn[ing it] to its precise facts”). Accordingly, in the Second Circuit, “only the
precise language in Kinoshita would evince a narrow clause.” Louis Dreyfus Negoce S.A. v. Blystad
Shipping & Trading Inc., 252 F.3d 218, 225 (2d Cir. 2001).
131 See, e.g., Dialysis Access Ctr., LLC v. RMS Lifeline, Inc., 638 F.3d 367, 380-82 (1st Cir.
2011); Highlands Wellmont Health Network, Inc. v. John Deere Health Plan, Inc., 350 F.3d 568,
577-78 (6th Cir. 2003); Battaglia v. McKendry, 233 F.3d 720, 724-28 (3d Cir. 2000); Gregory v.
Electro-Mech. Corp., 83 F.3d 382, 383-86 (11th Cir. 1996); Peoples Sec. Life Ins. Co. v. Monumental
Life Ins. Co., 867 F.2d 809, 813 (4th Cir. 1989).
132 Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Boston & Me. Corp., 850 F.2d 756, 762 (D.C. Cir. 1988);
Genesco, Inc. v. T. Kakiuchi & Co., 815 F.2d 840, 855 (2d Cir. 1987); see also Antonio Leonard TNT
Prods., LLC v. Goossen-Tutor Promotions, LLC, No. 13-3486, 2015 WL 269147, at *5 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 21,
2015) (“Arbitration clauses that also cover disputes ‘concerning this agreement’ are construed broadly.”).
133 Mediterranean Enters., Inc. v. Ssangyong Corp., 708 F.2d 1458, 1464 (9th Cir. 1983).
Alternatively, parties sometimes create ad hoc “narrow” clauses by using idiosyncratic language that
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Accordingly, narrow clauses do not cover conduct that is divorced from the
underlying agreement between the parties, such as claims for conversion,134
tortious interference,135 unfair competition,136 unjust enrichment,137
misappropriation of trade secrets,138 breach of a diﬀerent contract,139 and
statutory violations.140 This is true even if the dispute “would not have arisen
‘but for’ the parties’ agreement.”141
Conversely, “broad” provisions, which are much more common, create a
powerful “presumption of arbitrability” and “extend[] to ‘collateral
matters.’”142 To be arbitrable under a broad clause, a claim need only “hav[e] a
significant relationship to the [container] contract”143 or “at least ‘touch
matters’ related to [it].”144
Unfortunately, there is vast confusion about how the “signiﬁcant
relationship” and “touch matters” tests apply to real-world facts. This
indeterminacy shines through when a consumer or employee accuses a
defendant of grave wrongdoing. In some jurisdictions, a claim only falls
within the aegis of a broad clause if the defendant’s actions were “an

limits the ambit of their agreement to arbitrate. See, e.g., Turi v. Main St. Adoption Servs., LLP, 633
F.3d 496, 506, 510 (6th Cir. 2011) (clause that required arbitration for “fees charged by” an adoption
agency did not govern claims for fraud, conspiracy, misrepresentation, and RICO violations because
the claims “seek damages . . . that are separate from the fees paid” to the organization); In re TFTLCD (Flat Panel) Antitrust Litig., No. 11-5781 , 2013 WL 3784938, at *2-3 (N.D. Cal. July 18, 2013)
(holding that a provision that mandated arbitration “[i]f a dispute arises between the parties
regarding the terms of this [a]greement” did not apply to antitrust claims).
134 Mediterranean Enters., 708 F.2d at 1465. A claim for negligence might trigger a “narrow”
clause depending on its nature. See Cape Flattery Ltd., 647 F.3d at 924 (refusing to compel arbitration
of negligence complaint). But see Glass Design, Inc. v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc., No.
12-132, 2013 WL 12091106, at *4 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 7, 2013) (opining that negligence allegations
stemming from shoddy repair work fell within the scope of a “narrow” clause because they “relate
directly to the relationships, obligations, provisions, acts, and omissions allegedly established by the
[contract]” (quoting Alexander v. U.S. Credit Mgmt., 384 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1006 (N.D. Tex. 2005))).
135 A & A Mech., Inc. v. Satterﬁeld & Pontikes Constr. Grp., 83 So. 3d 363, 365, 369 (La. Ct.
App. 2012).
136 N. Am. Deer Registry, Inc. v. DNA Sols., Inc., No. 17-00062, 2017 WL 2120015, at *6 (E.D.
Tex. May 16, 2017).
137 RCM Techs., Inc. v. Constr. Servs. Assocs., Inc., 149 F. Supp. 2d 109, 114 (D.N.J. 2001).
138 Tracer Research Corp. v. Nat’l Envtl. Servs. Co., 42 F.3d 1292, 1295 (9th Cir. 1994).
139 Mediterranean Enters., 708 F.2d at 1464.
140 See, e.g., Busey v. Richland Sch. Dist., No. 13-5022, 2013 WL 12203526, at *3 (E.D. Wash.
June 21, 2013) (refusing to compel arbitration because the “Defendants’ liability arises from
independent statutory and constitutional provisions which accord the Plaintiﬀ rights irrespective of
the employment contract”).
141 Cape Flattery Ltd. v. Titan Mar., LLC, 647 F.3d 914, 924 (9th Cir. 2011).
142 JLM Indus., Inc. v. Stolt-Nielsen SA, 387 F.3d 163, 172 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Louis
Dreyfus Negoce S.A. v. Blystad Shipping & Trading Inc., 252 F.3d 218, 224 (2d Cir. 2001)).
143 Jones v. Halliburton Co., 583 F.3d 228, 235 (5th Cir. 2009).
144 Snyder v. CACH, LLC, No. 16-00097, 2016 WL 6662675, at *11, n.13 (D. Haw. Nov. 10, 2016).
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immediate, foreseeable result of the performance of contractual duties.”145
Consider Clay v. New Mexico Title Loans, Inc., which began when Harry Clay
used his truck as security for a loan that featured a broad arbitration clause.146
After Clay defaulted, an agent of the lender went to repossess the vehicle, got
into an altercation with Clay, pulled out a gun, and shot Clay in front of his
young daughter.147 Clay, who was paralyzed, sued the lender under a variety
of theories, including breach of the loan agreement and negligent hiring.148 A
New Mexico appellate court ordered arbitration of Clay’s contract claims, but
exempted his tort allegations, reasoning that the provision did not cover
causes of action that were “unrelated to the agreement [or] out of the context
of the agreement.”149
Yet other judges are more willing to find that similar claims are arbitrable.
Their version of the “significant relationship” or “touch matters” tests simply
asks whether the container contract plays a prominent role in the complaint. For
example, in Fazio v. Lehman Brothers, Inc., Frank Gruttadauria, a Cleveland
stockbroker, worked for several investment houses that subjected their clients to
broad arbitration clauses.150 Over the course of his career, Gruttadauria illegally
withdrew $54 million to fund a Ponzi scheme.151 When his customers learned of
his deception, they sued his employers for fraud and violation of securities
laws.152 The trial court refused to enforce the arbitration clauses because
Gruttadauria’s behavior “could not have been within the reasonable
contemplation of the Plaintiffs when they signed the alleged account
agreements.”153 The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the allegations
145 Telecom Italia, SpA v. Wholesale Telecom Corp., 248 F.3d 1109, 1116 (11th Cir. 2001). Seen
this way, a broad provision cannot govern actions that were “not contemplated by the parties when
the contract was made.” Seifert v. U.S. Home Corp., 750 So. 2d 633, 640 (Fla. 1999).
146 288 P.3d 888, 891 (N.M. Ct. App. 2012).
147 Id. at 891-92.
148 Id. at 892.
149 Id. at 896. Likewise, in Sutton v. Hollywood Entertainment Corp., 181 F. Supp. 2d 504, 506 (D.
Md. 2002), Robert Sutton, who was African American, went to rent a movie at Hollywood Video. A
clerk misidentified Sutton as the “black male” who had just robbed the store, causing him to be arrested
in a humiliating fashion. Id. at 506-07. The court held that the broad arbitration clause in Sutton’s video
store rental agreement did not apply to his tort claims. Id. at 511-12. The court acknowledged that “the
terms of the contract suggest that the parties are compelled to arbitrate matters related to matters such
as the rental fees, repairs, replacements of videos.” Id. at 511. “For example,” the court noted, “logical
claims to be arbitrated might include matters such as a dispute over dishonored checks written by the
customer or destruction of rented videos by the customer.” Id. at 511-12. The court found that Sutton’s
claims did not fall into those categories, stating that “claims such as those alleged here—malicious
prosecution, false imprisonment, etc.—are completely independent of, let alone significantly related
to, the membership agreements for video rentals.” Id. at 512.
150 340 F.3d 386, 391, 396 (6th Cir. 2003).
151 Id. at 391.
152 Id. at 391-92.
153 Fazio v. Lehman Bros., Inc., 268 F. Supp. 2d 865, 871 (N.D. Ohio 2002), rev’d, 340 F.3d 386
(6th Cir. 2003).
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“‘touch[ed] matters’ covered by the [agreement]” because it would be impossible
to tell the story of the case without mentioning the container contract.154
Three recurring fact patterns have generated especially unpredictable
results. First, courts are torn over whether to compel arbitration of an
employee’s tort claims against an employer stemming from a sexual assault
committed by a co-worker. Federal judges in Florida, New York, and Texas
have held that these allegations trigger a broad arbitration clause in the
employment agreement.155 The logic here is that even if a work-based attack
was heinous, the mere fact that it was work-based meant that it “related to or
ar[ose] from” the underlying contract.156 Indeed, as one judge put it, “these
claims do not merely touch on [the plaintiﬀ’s] employment, they are entirely
based on her employment.”157 However, the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits and
state courts in California, Kentucky, and Mississippi have disagreed.158
Focusing less on the setting and more on the deplorable nature of the
wrongdoing, they announced that “rape does not ordinarily arise out of the
employment context”159 and that an arbitration provision’s “scope certainly
stops at [the plaintiﬀ ’s] bedroom door.”160
Second, courts disagree about the arbitrability of tort claims related to
death. Suppose an employee, medical patient, or nursing home resident signs
154 Fazio, 340 F.3d at 395 (second brackets in original) (quoting Genesco, Inc. v. T. Kakiuchi &
Co., 815 F.2d 840, 846 (2d Cir. 1987)); see also Natale v. Frantz Ward, L.L.P., 110 N.E.3d 829, 832
(Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 12, 2018) (holding that plaintiﬀ ’s claim for intentional inﬂiction of emotional
distress fell under broad arbitration clause in his partnership agreement because “a court would
necessarily have to refer to the partnership agreement to understand the facts underlying his claim”).
155 See, e.g., Forbes v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., No. 08-552, 2009 WL 424146, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 18, 2009) (requiring employee to arbitrate her allegations that a supervisor sexually assaulted
her at a work-related conference); Barker v. Halliburton Co., 541 F. Supp. 2d 879, 882, 887 (S.D.
Tex. 2008) (same for civilian contractor stationed in Iraq); Oravetz v. Halliburton Co., No. 07-20285,
2007 WL 7067475, at *4 (S.D. Fla. July 24, 2007) (reasoning that the plaintiﬀ needed to arbitrate her
sexual assault claims by noting that she “repeatedly alleges that her assailant was acting in violation
of [d]efendants’ employment policies”).
156 Forbes, 2009 WL 424146, at *8.
157 Barker, 541 F. Supp. 2d at 887 (emphasis added).
158 See Doe v. Princess Cruise Lines, Ltd., 657 F.3d 1204, 1219 (11th Cir. 2011) (ﬁnding that an
employee’s claims of sexual assault were “not an immediate, foreseeable result of the performance of
the parties’ contractual duties” and were thus “not within the scope of the arbitration clause”
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Jones v. Halliburton Co., 583 F.3d 228, 241 (5th Cir. 2009)
(“Jones’ allegations [of sexual assault] do not touch matters related to her employment, let alone
have a signiﬁcant relationship to her employment contract.” (internal quotation marks omitted));
Abou-Khalil v. Miles, No. 037752, 2007 WL 1589456, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. June 4, 2007) (“[T]he law
is clear that sexual assault is not normally within the course and scope of employment.”); Hill v.
Hilliard, 945 S.W.2d 948, 952 (Ky. Ct. App. 1996) (refusing to “expand the arbitration agreement”
to include claims of rape, assault, and battery that were “independent of the employment
relationship”); cf. Doe v. Hallmark Partners, 227 So. 3d 1052, 1056-58 (Miss. 2017) (holding that the
plaintiﬀ was not required to arbitrate sexual assault tort claims despite a “broad” arbitration clause).
159 Hill, 945 S.W.2d at 952.
160 Jones, 583 F.3d at 239.
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a contract that contains an arbitration clause and then is killed by the drafter’s
negligence. Many states recognize a cause of action for wrongful death, in
which the decedent’s family sues to recover damages for their own economic
and emotional harm.161 However, wrongful death complaints come in two
diﬀerent varieties. In some states, such a claim ﬂows “directly from the claim
possessed by the decedent, had he or she lived.”162 As a result, such a lawsuit
is “derivative,” meaning that the victim’s relatives “stand in the position of
their decedent” and are bound by the arbitration agreement in the container
contract.163 But elsewhere, “[a] wrongful death action is not a transmitted
right nor a survival right but is created and vested in the statutorily
designated survivors at the moment of death.”164 Accordingly, in these states,
a plaintiﬀ is not a party “to the initial agreement containing an arbitration
clause [and] is not bound by the clause in her independent cause of action for
the wrongful death.”165 Thus, courts have not spoken with a single voice about
the arbitrability of wrongful death claims.
161 See, e.g., Andrew Jay McClurg, It’s a Wonderful Life: The Case for Hedonic Damages in Wrongful
Death Cases, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 57, 62-63 (1990) (canvassing the development of these laws).
The decedent’s estate can also assert a survival action, which attempts to recover damages for the
decedent’s medical costs or pain and suﬀering. See, e.g., Kiser v. Schulte, 648 A.2d 1, 4 (Pa. 1994).
Survival actions are arbitrable because the decedent “agreed to arbitrate his claims against the
company, whether brought during his life or after his death.” Peters v. Columbus Steel Castings Co.,
873 N.E.2d 1258, 1262 (Oh. 2007); see also Peltz ex rel. Estate of Peltz v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 367
F. Supp. 2d 711, 718 (E.D. Pa. 2005) (holding that decedent’s administrator “merely stands in her
shoes” and is thus bound by an arbitration clause that the decedent signed); In re Golden Peanut
Co., 298 S.W.3d 629, 631 (Tex. 2009) (“If [the decedent] had sued for his own injuries immediately
before his death, he would have been bound to submit his claims to arbitration.”).
162 THI of New Mexico at Hobbs Ctr., LLC v. Spradlin, 532 F. App’x 813, 817 (10th Cir. 2013).
163 Carter v. Miss. Dep’t of Corr., 860 So. 2d 1187, 1192 (Miss. 2003); Schultz ex rel. Schultz v.
GGNSC St. Paul Lake Ridge LLC, 310 F. Supp. 3d 985, 990 (D. Minn. 2018); Laizure v. Avante at
Leesburg, Inc., 109 So. 3d 752, 761-62 (Fla. 2013); Roth v. Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan
Soc’y, 886 N.W.2d 601, 608 (Iowa 2016).
164 Finney v. Nat’l Healthcare Corp., 193 S.W.3d 393, 395 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006). Because this
version of the claim arises out of the wrongful death statute, it is “in no way related to the [container]
agreement.” McCall ex rel. Estate of McCall v. SSC Montgomery S. Haven Operating Co., No. 14588, 2015 WL 13603823, at *11 (M.D. Ala. Aug. 6, 2015). Likewise, in some states, “[a] loss of
consortium claim is also a statutorily created independent claim that accrues to the spouse.
Therefore, just as a decedent cannot bind his heirs to arbitrate a wrongful death claim, the decedent
also cannot bind his heirs to arbitrate a loss of consortium claim.” Life Care Ctrs. v. Neblett, No.
14-00124, 2014 WL 7179652, at *3 (W.D. Ky. Dec. 17, 2014) (internal citations omitted); accord Roth,
886 N.W.2d at 613 (holding that “the [decedent’s] child owns the . . . consortium claim”).
165 Finney, 193 S.W.3d at 397; see also Estate of Decamacho ex rel. Guthrie v. La Solana Care &
Rehab, Inc., 234 Ariz. 18, 316 P.3d 607, 614 (Ct. App. 2014) (holding that a wrongful death claim
against a nursing home not arbitrable because it “is independently held by the decedent’s statutory
beneﬁciaries”); Norton v. United Health Servs. of Ga., Inc., 783 S.E.2d 437, 440-41 (Ga. App. 2016)
(“[T]here is no evidence that [decedent]’s wrongful death beneﬁciaries entered into an agreement
to arbitrate their separate distinct claims.”), rev’d, 797 S.E.2d 825 (Ga. 2017); Carter v. SSC Odin
Operating Co., 976 N.E.2d 344, 355-58 (Ill. 2012) (refusing to hold wrongful-death action plaintiﬀ
to decedent’s arbitration agreement); Ping v. Beverly Enters., Inc., 376 S.W.3d 581, 600 (Ky. 2012)
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Third, it can be unclear whether arbitration clauses outlive the container
contract. In general, when a deal terminates, so do the parties’ rights and
obligations.166 But if the duty to arbitrate ended along with the agreement,
parties could game the system and guarantee themselves a judicial forum
simply by waiting to sue until the day after the contract lapsed. Thus, the
Court has held that claims brought after the container contract has expired
are presumptively arbitrable if they feature (1) facts that occurred before the
contract ended, (2) rights that vested under the arrangement, or (3)
obligations that were supposed to “survive[] expiration of the remainder of
the agreement.”167
Not every case slots neatly into one of these categories. For example, a
federal court in Mississippi held that an arbitration clause in an employee’s
initial hiring paperwork did not apply when he worked for Red Lobster from
2002 until 2003, quit, worked for Red Lobster again from 2006 until 2013,
quit, and then sued for sexual harassment.168 Likewise, in the credit,
distribution, lease, and subscription contexts—where the parties sometimes
continue to interact after the container contract terminates—“an arbitration
agreement may survive . . . with respect to certain claims, but not others.”169
To conclude, courts struggle with whether broad arbitration clauses cover
egregious acts, apply to nonparties, and persist beyond the termination of the
container contract. As I discuss next, businesses have begun to try to draft
around these pockets of doctrinal chaos.

(same); FutureCare NorthPoint, LLC v. Peeler, 143 A.3d 191, 209-10, 213 (Md. 2016) (same); Wolcott
v. Summerville at Outlook Manor, LLC, 61 N.E.3d 853, 856 (Oh. Ct. App. 2016) (same); Boler v.
Sec. Health Care, L.L.C., 336 P.3d 468, 477 (Okla. 2014) (same); Woodall v. Avalon Care Ctr.-Fed.
Way, LLC, 231 P.3d 1252, 1261 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010) (same).
166 See, e.g., Poore v. Simpson Paper Co., 566 F.3d 922, 927 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[W]here the
contract at issue has expired, the parties are ‘released . . . from their respective contractual obligations’
and any dispute between them cannot be said to arise under the contract” (citation omitted)).
167 Litton Fin. Printing Div. v. N.L.R.B., 501 U.S. 190, 206 (1991). Initially, the Court had
announced that “where the dispute is over a provision of [an] expired agreement, the presumptions
favoring arbitrability must be negated expressly or by clear implication.” Nolde Bros. v. Local No.
358, Bakery & Confectionery Workers Union, AFL-CIO, 430 U.S. 243, 255 (1977). Later, the Court
clariﬁed that this presumption of arbitrability only applies to “disputes arising out of the relation
governed by contract.” Litton, 501 U.S. at 204.
168 Walker v. Red Lobster Rests., LLC, No. 14-449, 2015 WL 3970917, at *1, *3 (S.D. Miss.
June 30, 2015). For other cases ﬁnding that an employee’s claim did not arise out of an expired
contract, see Zucker v. After Six, Inc., 174 F. App’x 944, 948 (6th Cir. 2006), Mendez v. Puerto Rican
Int’l Cos., No. 05-00174, 2010 WL 2654439, at *1 (D.V.I. July 1, 2010), aﬀ ’d sub nom. Mendez v. Puerto
Rican Int’l Cos., 438 F. App’x 161, 165 (3d Cir. 2011), and Vara v. Menard, Inc., No. 05-0551, 2005 WL
2886075, at *3 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 28, 2005).
169 Hinnant v. Am. Ingenuity, LLC, 554 F. Supp. 2d 576, 583 (E.D. Pa. 2008).
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B. Infinite Arbitration Clauses
This Section reveals that companies have tried to patch the holes in broad
clauses by mandating arbitration for every dispute between any associated
parties for eternity. Courts ﬁrst gave these inﬁnite clauses the cold shoulder
by applying traditional principles of contract interpretation and the
unconscionability defense. However, the Court’s recent cases have unsettled
the law by implying that the FAA preempts any state rule that discriminates
against arbitration.
1. The Rise of the Inﬁnite Clause
Shortly after the dawn of the new millennium, arbitration clauses
metastasized. For one, companies stopped confining their provisions to claims
that “arose out of or related to” the container contract.170 For example, when
AT&T acquired Cingular and formed Mobility171—an entity that boasts
almost 147,000,000 customers172—it revamped its arbitration clause to cover
“all disputes and claims.”173 Sprint soon followed suit, changing its 70,000,000
arbitration provisions to cover “ANY (we really mean ANY) disagreements.”174
Ultra-broad arbitration provisions began to appear in employment contracts,175

170 To be clear, inﬁnite arbitration clauses are not a twenty-ﬁrst century innovation. See In re
Canadian Gulf Line, 98 F.2d 711, 712 (2d Cir. 1938) (featuring a maritime contract that required
arbitration of “any dispute . . . between the Owners and the Charterers”). However, it is only in the
last decade or so that inﬁnite clauses have gone mainstream.
171 See Alan Sipress & Sara Kehaulani Goo, AT&T Completes BellSouth Takeover, WASH. POST
(Dec. 30, 2006), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/12/29/AR2006122901
048.html?noredirect=on [https://perma.cc/LVZ8-BJ5Y].
172 See Arne Holst, Wireless Subscriptions Market Share by Carrier in the U.S. from 1st Quarter 2011
to 3rd Quarter 2018, STATISTA (Dec. 16, 2019), https://www.statista.com/statistics/199359/marketshare-of-wireless-carriers-in-the-us-by-subscriptions/ [https://perma.cc/63X3-UW6W].
173 File a Complaint, AT&T, https://www.att.com/esupport/article.html#!/wireless/KM1041856
[https://perma.cc/GK45-7VDB] (last visited Jan. 2, 2020). Previously, Cingular had only mandated
arbitration for “all disputes and claims . . . arising out of or relating to this Agreement.” Response to
Defendant AT&T Mobility Corp.’s Motion to Compel Arbitration Pursuant to the Federal
Arbitration Act at 7, Weinstein v. AT&T Mobility Corp., 2008 WL 1914754 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 30, 2008)
(No. 07-2880) (emphasis added).
174 Sprint Terms and Conditions, SPRINT, https://www.sprint.com/en/legal/terms-andconditions.html [https://perma.cc/2993-VQP4] (last visited Jan. 2, 2020). This language replaced
Sprint’s previous clause requiring arbitration for “claims, controversies[,] or disputes arising out of
or relating to this agreement.” Petition to Compel Arbitration and for Related Relief ¶ 11, Emilio v.
Sprint Spectrum L.P., No. 08-7147 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 2008), 2008 WL 4518240 (emphasis omitted).
175 See, e.g., Lemmon v. Lincoln Prop. Co., 307 F. Supp. 2d 1352, 1353 (M.D. Fla. 2004) (“I
agree that any claim dispute or controversy between myself and the Company shall be submitted to
and determined exclusively by binding arbitration . . . .”).
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bank account paperwork,176 agreements to rent cars177 or equipment,178 and
even applications to join the Church of Scientology.179 Some were verbose,
like a loan that insisted on arbitration for “all disputes, claims, or controversies
whether based upon any prior, current, or future agreement, loan, account,
service, activity, transaction (proposed or actual), event or occurrence
(‘Disputes’) whether individual, joint, or class in nature, including contract
and tort disputes and any other matter at law or equity.”180 Others were simple,
such as the cruise line that required its employees to arbitrate
“all . . . disputes”181 and the for-profit university that informed its students
that “any dispute between us shall be submitted to [a]rbitration.”182
Businesses also began enlarging arbitration clauses along other
dimensions. Recall that many jurisdictions exempt wrongful death claims
from arbitration because the plaintiﬀs in such a case—the decedent’s
relatives—never signed the container contract.183 Companies attempted to
write their way around this hurdle by stating that the arbitration agreement
govern[s] “all persons whose claim is derived through or on behalf of the
[signatory], including any parent, spouse, sibling, child, guardian, executor,

176 See, e.g., Regions’ Motion to Compel Arbitration and to Stay Proceedings at 3, Regions
Bank v. Douglas, 2012 WL 5400040 (S.D. Miss. Nov. 5, 2012) (No. 12-00523) (quoting an arbitration
clause that applies to “any dispute, disagreement, claim or controversy . . . regardless of when the
dispute arose” (emphasis omitted)).
177 See, e.g., Terms and Conditions, HERTZ, https://www.hertz.com/rentacar/member/enrollment/
displayTermsAndConditions [https://perma.cc/9V6J-UUEV] (last updated Oct. 31, 2019) (“Except for
claims for property damage, personal injury, or death, ANY DISPUTES BETWEEN US MUST BE
RESOLVED ONLY BY ARBITRATION OR IN A SMALL CLAIMS COURT ON AN
INDIVIDUAL BASIS . . . .”).
178 Appellants’ Brief at 3-4, Granger v. Rent-A-Center, Inc., 503 S.W.3d 295 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016)
(No. 79584), 2016 WL 3771603. This case entailed arbitration agreements for rental of a television and
of a refrigerator; the former described “claims” as “any claim, dispute, or controversy between you and
us that in any way arises from the RPA or the leased property . . .” and the latter provided that “claims
shall be interpreted as broadly as the law allows, and means any dispute or controversy between you
and Rent-A-Center, its officers, directors, employees, or agents . . . .” Id. (citations omitted).
179 See Garcia v. Church of Scientology Flag Serv. Org., Inc., No. 13-220-27, 2015 WL 10844160,
at *10 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 13, 2015) (“[S]hould any dispute, claim, or controversy arise between me and the
Church . . . I will pursue resolution of that dispute, claim or controversy solely and exclusively through
Scientology’s Internal Ethics, Justice and binding religious arbitration procedures . . . .” (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted)).
180 Southland Health Servs., Inc. v. Bank of Vernon, 887 F. Supp. 2d 1158, 1164 (N.D. Ala. 2012).
181 Yuzwa v. M/V OOSTERDAM, No. 12-2663, 2012 WL 6675171, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2012).
182 Defendants’ Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Notice of Motion and
Motion to Compel Individual Arbitration and Stay Proceedings Pending Arbitration at 3, Ferguson
v. Corinthian Colls., Inc., No. 11-00127, 2011 WL 13262654 (C.D. Cal. May 17, 2011) (citation
omitted). As John Coyle has recently shown, drafters in business-to-business transactions have also
created forum selection clauses that govern “any claim arising out of the parties’ relationship.” John
F. Coyle, Interpreting Forum Selection Clauses, 104 IOWA L. REV. 1791, 1804 n.47 (2019).
183 See supra text accompanying notes 164–165.
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legal representative, administrator, or heir.”184 Likewise, ﬁrms oﬀered to lend
their arbitration rights to a rainbow of nonsignatory defendants, such as their
“members, shareholders, or subsidiary or parent or aﬃliated companies, and
its or their oﬃcers, directors, employees, and agents.”185 And to ensure that
their arbitration clauses endured after the container contract expired, drafters
included language specifying that the commitment to arbitrate “survives the
termination of your [s]ervice[s] with us”186 or “[i]s indeﬁnite.”187
Finally, businesses added another layer of private dispute resolution by
requiring disputes about the arbitrability of a particular lawsuit to be decided
in arbitration. Through delegation clauses, they gave the arbitrator the
exclusive right to decide whether a dispute fell within the scope of an
arbitration clause. From banking to employment to telecommunications,
companies mandated arbitration not just for substantive claims, but for
conﬂict related to “the validity, enforceability or scope of [an] Arbitration
Provision.”188 Thus, when plaintiﬀs objected that an arbitration clause did not
encompass a speciﬁc cause of action, these businesses countered that the
parties had “clearly and unmistakably” agreed to arbitrate the matter.189
184 Schultz ex rel. Schultz v. GGNSC St. Paul Lake Ridge LLC, 310 F. Supp. 3d 985, 987 (D.
Minn. 2018).
185 Gerardino v. TPVI Ltd., No. 08-0016, 2009 WL 1586673, at *1 (D.V.I. June 2, 2009).
186 Milfort v. Comcast Cable Commc’ns Mgmt. LLC, 309 F. Supp. 3d 1268, 1272 (S.D. Fla. 2018).
187 Hodsdon v. DirecTV, LLC, No. 12-2827, 2012 WL 5464615, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2012)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
188 Laumann v. Nat’l Hockey League, 989 F. Supp. 2d 329, 334 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (quotation
omitted); see also Barker v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., No. 03-0130, 2003 WL 25943008, at *3 (W.D. Tex.
May 30, 2003) (addressing language in a credit card agreement that classiﬁes as “subject to
arbitration . . . [c]laims regarding the application, enforceability, or interpretation of this
Agreement and this arbitration provision . . . .”).
189 Aceves v. Autonation, Inc., 317 F. App’x 665, 666 (9th Cir. 2009). In addition, even when a
contract does not contain an express delegation clause, it often achieves the same result through the
back door. Drafters often choose to arbitrate under the auspices of a particular institution, such as the
American Arbitration Association or JAMS. In turn, these companies have internal rules that permit
the arbitrator to rule on “any objections with respect to the existence, scope, or validity of the arbitration
agreement.” AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, CONSUMER ARBITRATION RULES 17 (2016), https://www.
adr.org/sites/default/files/Consumer%20Rules.pdf [https://perma.cc/89H8-STGC]; accord JAMS,
JAMS COMPREHENSIVE ARBITRATION RULES & PROCEDURES 15 (2014), https://www.jams
adr.com/files/Uploads/Documents/JAMS-Rules/JAMS_comprehensive_arbitration_rules-2014.pdf
[https://perma.cc/F8Q4-S63W] (allowing “[t]he [a]rbitrator . . . to determine jurisdiction and
arbitrability issues as a preliminary matter”). Courts routinely find that merely referencing an
arbitration provider incorporates these rules by reference and thus functions as a delegation clause. See,
e.g., Belnap v. Iasis Healthcare, 844 F.3d 1272, 1282-83 (10th Cir. 2017) (holding, when the arbitration
agreement provided that “arbitration shall be administered by JAMS and conducted in accordance with
its Streamlined Arbitration Rules and Procedures . . . except as provided otherwise herein,” the parties
had thus “incorporated the JAMS Rules into their Agreement” and “intended for an arbitrator to decide
issues of arbitrability” (emphasis omitted)); Brennan v. Opus Bank, 796 F.3d 1125, 1130 (9th Cir. 2015)
(“[W]e hold that incorporation of the AAA rules constitutes clear and unmistakable evidence that
contracting parties agreed to arbitrate arbitrability.”).
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2. Judicial Skepticism
Initially, judges pushed back against inﬁnite language. The poster child
for this movement was Smith v. Steinkamp, a 2003 Seventh Circuit decision.190
Sheila Smith took out a payday loan from Instant Cash and signed an
agreement “to arbitrate ‘all disputes’ between the [p]arties.”191 A month later,
Smith borrowed from Instant Cash again, but did not sign an arbitration
agreement.192 Eventually, Smith sued Instant Cash, arguing that the second
loan violated state usury law and RICO.193 Instant Cash moved to compel
arbitration, arguing that Smith’s lawsuit was a “dispute[] between the
[p]arties” and thus triggered the ﬁrst loan’s arbitration clause.194 Speaking
through Judge Posner, the court rejected this interpretation by listing the
absurd consequences it would spawn:
[I]f Instant Cash murdered Smith in order to discourage defaults and her
survivors brought a wrongful death suit against Instant Cash . . . , Instant
Cash could insist that the wrongful death claim be submitted to arbitration.
For that matter, if an employee of Instant Cash picked Smith’s pocket when
she came in to pay back the loan, and Smith sued the employee for
conversion, he would be entitled to arbitration of her claim. It would make
no diﬀerence that the conversion had occurred in Smith’s home 20 years after
her last transaction with Instant Cash.195

In addition, Judge Posner added that an agreement “to arbitrate disputes
arising out of future agreements . . . might be thought unconscionable.”196
Although several courts followed Smith’s footsteps, they disagreed on
precisely what was objectionable about inﬁnite provisions. Some ran with
Judge Posner’s suggestion and held that mandating arbitration for complaints
that were attenuated from the container contract would be unconscionable.
For example, in Valued Services of Kentucky, LLC v. Watkins, Floyd Watkins
received a payday loan from Check Advance that contained an inﬁnite
clause.197 When the balance became due, Watkins went to Check Advance and
318 F.3d 775 (7th Cir. 2003).
Consolidated Reply Brief of Defendants-Appellants at 1, Smith, 318 F.3d 775 (Nos. 02-2649,
02-2650), 2002 WL 32171900 [hereinafter Smith Reply Brief].
192 Smith, 318 F.3d at 777.
193 Id. at 776.
194 Smith Reply Brief, supra note 191.
195 Smith, 318 F.3d at 777.
196 Id. at 778. Judge Posner also noted that the arbitration agreement only applied to the ﬁrst
loan and the parties’ “prior . . . agreements.” Id. at 777 (emphasis added). In turn, this suggested that
the arbitration clause did not cover the second loan, which came later. Id. Ultimately, though, he
“d[id] not put too much weight on this point” and remarked that the defendant might lose even if
“the word ‘prior’ had not appeared” in ﬁrst loan’s arbitration agreement. Id. at 777-78.
197 309 S.W.3d 256, 258-61 (Ky. Ct. App. 2009).
190
191
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told the manager that he needed three more days to raise the funds.198 The
manager pushed a button that locked her oﬃce door, refused to open it,
telephoned her boss, and said, “I have a black guy over here that refuses to
pay his bill and he’s not going to leave until he does.”199 Watkins, who was
detained until the police arrived, sued Check Advance for false
imprisonment.200 A Kentucky appellate court held that enforcing the inﬁnite
provision would be grossly unfair, comparing it to ordering “arbitration had
[d]efendants sent 2 men to [p]laintiﬀ ’s house to break his legs because he was
behind in his payment.”201
Other judges reached the same result under rules of contract
interpretation. For instance, in Aiken v. World Finance Corp., the South
Carolina Supreme Court created what became known as the “outrageous
torts” exception to the FAA.202 Richard Aiken borrowed money from World
Finance.203 Aiken’s contract mandated arbitration for claims “arising out of
any prior or future dealings between lender and borrower.”204 Two years after
Aiken had paid oﬀ his debt, World Finance personnel used Aiken’s social
security number to take out loans in his name and steal the proceeds.205 When
Aiken sued for negligent hiring, World Finance argued that his lawsuit
“aros[e] out of ” the parties’ “prior dealings” because his ﬁnance application
gave the rogue employees “access to [his] information in order to carry out
their crimes.”206 Without denying that the plain language of the arbitration
clause covered Aiken’s complaint, the state high court refused to send the case
to arbitration.207 Instead, the justices held that “even the most broadlyworded arbitration agreements” do not govern conduct that is so extreme that
it is “unforeseeable to a reasonable consumer in the context of normal
business dealings.”208
Finally, other courts ignored inﬁnite language without explaining their
holdings. Rust v. Carriage Services provides a memorable example.209 The
Rusts purchased a crypt in a mausoleum to hold the remains of a relative (the

Id. at 258.
Id.
Id. at 259.
Id. at 261, 265.
644 S.E.2d 705, 709 (S.C. 2007).
Id. at 707.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
Id.
Id. at 707-08.
Id. at 710.
Id. at 709; see also Arnold v. Burger King, 48 N.E.3d 69, 72, 78 (Ohio Ct. App. 2015) (relying
on Aiken to refuse to compel arbitration of workplace rape claim even though arbitration agreement
covered “events outside the scope of [the plaintiﬀ ’s] employment” (emphasis omitted)).
209 173 P.3d 805 (Ok. Ct. App. 2007).
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
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“crypt contract”).210 Their agreement with the cemetery did not contain an
arbitration clause.211 Years later, the couple bought a commemorative bench
from the same graveyard and signed a contract that required them to arbitrate
“any controversy or claim arising between the parties” (the “bench
contract”).212 The couple then visited their relative’s crypt and made a
horrifying discovery: “[T]he body in the crypt above their decedent’s was
interred in a way that caused the crypt to leak decaying human remains out
of the crypt and onto the crypt containing Rusts’ decedent.”213 According to
the Rusts, “when they visited their decedent’s crypt, . . . they touched the
liquid in an eﬀort to determine what the substance was, and . . . became
physically ill when they realized what they had touched.”214 The Rusts sued
for negligent treatment of human remains and negligent inﬂiction of
emotional distress, and the cemetery tried to invoke the arbitration clause in
the bench contract.215 A divided Oklahoma appellate court denied the motion,
reasoning that the lawsuit arose from the crypt contract, not the bench
contract.216 But as the dissent pointed out, the majority simply did not
address the brute fact that “the arbitration provision is not limited to disputes
arising out of the contract containing the arbitration clause,” but rather “applies
to any dispute between the parties.”217
Accordingly, until 2010, although the law was embryonic, most courts
believed that arbitration agreements “cannot cover every type of dispute that
might arise.”218 But as I explain next, that would soon change.
3. The Arbitration Revolution
In the last decade, the Court has revolutionized the field of forced
arbitration. As the Justices expanded the degree to which the FAA preempts
state law, they may have implicitly overruled the lower court cases that refused
to enforce infinite language. Likewise, by embracing delegation provisions, the
Court has made it easier for companies to entrust arbitrators with deciding the
very issue of whether a dispute falls within the scope of an arbitration clause.

210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217
218

Id. at 807.
Id.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 808 n.5.
Id.
Id. at 808.
Id. at 808-09.
Id. at 809 (Buettner, J., dissenting).
RN Sol., Inc. v. Catholic Healthcare W., 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d 892, 902 (Ct. App. 2008).
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a. Preemption
The backdrop for the Court’s recent cases is the intersection of the FAA
and class actions. For decades, businesses and chambers of commerce had
condemned the class device for allowing plaintiﬀs’ lawyers to combine
thousands of nuisance lawsuits into a single complaint and then wield
“blackmail” settlement pressure.219 But as the Justices ramped up the FAA,
businesses saw a cure for this scourge.220 In the late 1990s and early 2000s,
they started inserting class action waivers into their forced arbitration clauses
and arguing that their customers and employees had agreed not only to
arbitrate, but to do so on an individual basis.221
Then, in the mid-2000s, this attempt at private law reform hit a speed
bump. Recall that § 2 allows courts to strike down arbitration clauses under
traditional contract law (i.e., any “grounds [that] . . . exist at law or in equity
for the revocation of any contract”).222 In 2005, the California Supreme Court
invoked this principle in § 2 in Discover Bank v. Superior Court, an inﬂuential
decision holding that class arbitration waivers are unconscionable when
applied to many low-value consumer claims.223 Soon more than a dozen
jurisdictions endorsed this logic, reasoning that because few plaintiﬀs will
actually prosecute their own small dollar grievances, class arbitration waivers
unfairly immunize drafters from liability.224
However, in 2011, the U.S. Supreme Court held in AT&T Mobility LLC v.
Concepcion that the FAA preempts Discover Bank and its progeny.225 The Court
conceded that unconscionability is a “ground[] . . . for the revocation of any
contract” under § 2.226 Nevertheless, the Justices determined that Discover
Bank’s use of the doctrine violated the FAA’s goal of “enforc[ing] . . . arbitration
agreements according to their terms so as to facilitate streamlined

219 See In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1298 (7th Cir. 1995) (quoting HENRY J.
FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 120 (1973)).
220 See Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise of the Modern
Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373, 396-98 (2005) (describing the rise of class arbitration waivers
in the late 1990s).
221 See Margaret Mannix, No Suits for You, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., June 7, 1999, 58, 60
(“Many arbitration clauses state that consumers cannot ﬁle class-action lawsuits—a key reason the
clauses are spreading so quickly.”).
222 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2018).
223 113 P.3d 1100, 1110-12 (Cal. 2005).
224 See Kinkel v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 857 N.E.2d 250, 275 (Ill. 2006) (“[T]he plaintiﬀ ’s
only reasonable, cost-eﬀective means of obtaining a complete remedy [was] as either the
representative or a member of a class.”); David Horton, Federal Arbitration Act Preemption,
Purposivism, and State Public Policy, 101 GEO. L.J. 1217, 1237 n.165 (2013) (collecting cases in
jurisdictions that endorsed this logic).
225 563 U.S. 333, 352 (2011).
226 Id. at 341 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
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proceedings.”227 According to the Court, Discover Bank undercut this goal by
insisting that classwide arbitration be available for small claims, which made
the dispute resolution process slower and more formal.228 Although Concepcion
dealt with the singular setting of class actions and arbitration, it also broke new
ground by finding that an entrenched principle like unconscionability could be
preempted. Thus, some judges and commentators read the opinion to stand for
the bold proposition that any state law that “ha[s] a disproportionate impact on
arbitration agreements” must bow to the FAA.229
Then, on the heels of Concepcion, the Court brought FAA preemption into
the realm of contract interpretation in DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia.230 In 2004,
DIRECTV added a class arbitration waiver to its customer agreement.231 A
year later, Discover Bank came down, making it likely that DIRECTV’s
provision was unconscionable in certain states.232 But if a court invalidated
the class arbitration waiver, DIRECTV strongly preferred to litigate class
claims in court, where there was less danger of getting stung by a massive
judgment with no meaningful appellate review. Therefore, the company
addressed this contingency through a “blow up clause,” which declared that
“if the ‘law of your state’ makes the waiver of class arbitration unenforceable,
then the entire arbitration provision ‘is unenforceable.’”233
In 2008, a class of California plaintiﬀs sued DIRECTV for charging an
illegal early termination fee.234 The case was still percolating through the legal
system in 2011, when the Court decided Concepcion and shielded many class
arbitration waivers from judicial review.235 Nevertheless, in 2014, a California
appellate court held that DIRECTV’s class arbitration waiver was invalid
“under the law of ” the California Supreme Court’s now-defunct Discover
Bank opinion.236 In turn, under the blow up clause, “the entire arbitration
agreement [wa]s unenforceable.”237

Id. at 344.
Id. at 347-49.
Mortensen v. Bresnan Commc’ns, LLC, 722 F.3d 1151, 1162 (9th Cir. 2013); see also Arpan
A. Sura & Robert A. DeRise, Conceptualizing Concepcion: The Continuing Viability of Arbitration
Regulations, 62 U. KAN. L. REV. 403, 408 (2013) (arguing that Concepcion “threatens to jeopardize a
bevy of facially neutral contract laws as they are applied to arbitration agreements”).
230 136 S. Ct. 463, 466 (2015).
231 Cohen v. DIRECTV, Inc., 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d 813, 815 (Ct. App. 2006), abrogated by AT&T
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011).
232 See supra text accompanying notes 223–224.
233 Imburgia v. DIRECTV, Inc., 170 Cal. Rptr. 3d 190, 198 (Ct. App. 2014), rev’d, 136 S. Ct.
463 (2015).
234 Id. at 192.
235 Id. at 193.
236 Id. at 194.
237 Id. at 198.
227
228
229
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The Supreme Court reversed.238 The Justices admitted that “the
interpretation of a contract is ordinarily a matter of state law to which we
defer,”239 but held that the state appellate panel had grossly distorted the
meaning of the blow up clause.240 Speciﬁcally, the Court noted that there was
no authority for the view that the phrase “the law of your state” included
“state laws authoritatively held to be invalid.”241 Thus, the Court held that
California appellate court had ﬂouted federal law by failing to “place
arbitration contracts ‘on equal footing with all other contracts.’”242
Concepcion and DIRECTV imperil the decisions that refused to enforce
inﬁnite language. To make this point concrete, consider In re Jiﬀy Lube
International, Inc., Text Spam Litigation, an early and oft-cited opinion
rejecting inﬁnite language.243 A class of consumers sued Heartland
Automotive Services, Inc., which operates hundreds of Jiﬀy Lube
franchises.244 The plaintiﬀs alleged that Heartland had violated the TCPA by
harvesting their phone numbers when they received oil changes and sending
them spam text messages.245 However, at least one plaintiﬀ had signed a Jiﬀy
Lube “pledge of satisfaction” that required him to arbitrate “any and all
disputes, controversies or claims between Jiﬀy Lube® and you.”246 A
California district court held that this unlimited obligation to arbitrate did
not govern the complaint for two reasons.247 First, it opined that an
arbitration provision that “is not limited to disputes arising from or related
to the transaction or contract at issue . . . would clearly be unconscionable.”248
Second, it observed that it would be unreasonable to interpret the arbitration
provision to encompass a statutory violation that had so little in common with
the container contract.249
However, the Court’s recent opinions suggest that the FAA trumps this
logic. For example, Concepcion held that a court cannot apply the
unconscionability doctrine in a way that discriminates against arbitration.250
Jiﬀy Lube and other opinions have concluded that inﬁnite provisions are
DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463, 471 (2015).
Id. at 468.
Id. at 469.
Id.
Id. at 471 (quoting Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 443 (2006)).
847 F. Supp. 2d 1253, 1262-63 (S.D. Cal. 2012). Although Jiﬀy Lube was decided shortly after
Concepcion, the ramiﬁcations of the Court’s decision had not yet set in, as evidenced by the fact that
Jiﬀy Lube does not discuss Concepcion in depth at all.
244 Id. at 1255.
245 Id. at 1255-56.
246 Id. at 1262.
247 Id. at 1262-63.
248 Id. at 1262-63.
249 Id. at 1263.
250 See supra text accompanying notes 226–229.
238
239
240
241
242
243

666

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 168: 633

grossly harsh because they govern conduct that “could not have been foreseen
by [the plaintiﬀ] when he signed that agreement.”251 Arguably, this use of the
unconscionability doctrine draws the very inference that Concepcion prohibits:
that there is something inherently troubling about private dispute resolution.
Indeed, even if the breadth of an inﬁnite clause is surprising, it simply means
that a plaintiﬀ must arbitrate a claim that she thought she might litigate.
Deeming such an arrangement to be “unfair” treats arbitration as tainted and
inferior. Accordingly, at least one court has noted that holding that an inﬁnite
clause “is unconscionably broad would be in tension with Concepcion.”252
Jiﬀy Lube’s other ground for annulling inﬁnite language might not fare
better. In the same breath as its unconscionability rhetoric, Jiﬀy Lube also
observed that, given the narrow subject matter of the “pledge of satisfaction”
and the unrelated nature of the company’s wrongdoing, “it is doubtful
whether [reading the arbitration clause to cover all issues ‘aris[ing] out of or
relate[d] to’] would encompass the claims here.”253 Seen through this prism,
principles of contract interpretation can exempt unforeseeable causes of
action from the seemingly-limitless reach of an inﬁnite clause. But after
DIRECTV, this reasoning is suspect. Indeed, the South Carolina Supreme
Court, which invented the “outrageous torts” exception to the FAA, recently
came within one vote of abolishing it because it is “‘unique,’ and ‘restricted’
to the ﬁeld of arbitration.”254
Not coincidentally, in the last two years, some courts have ordered
arbitration of claims that have little to do with the container contract.255 For
example, in 2018, the Eighth Circuit enforced inﬁnite language in Parm v.
Bluestem Brands, Inc.256 Bluestem, an online retailer, allows shoppers to buy
goods with credit accounts that are serviced by a bank.257 The relationship
between the bank and its borrowers is governed by a separate contract that
mandates arbitration for any claim involving “the actions of yourself, us or
third parties.”258 When a class of plaintiﬀs contended that Bluestem had
charged illegal fees, Bluestem argued that it was entitled to enforce the
arbitration provision in the standalone agreement between the plaintiﬀs and
251 Valued Servs. of Ky., LLC v. Watkins, 309 S.W.3d 256, 265 (Ky. Ct. App. 2009); see also
Jiﬀy Lube, 847 F. Supp. 2d at 1262-63.
252 Wexler v. AT & T Corp., 211 F. Supp. 3d 500, 504 (E.D.N.Y. 2016).
253 Jiﬀy Lube, 847 F. Supp. 2d at 1263.
254 Parsons v. John Wieland Homes & Neighborhoods of the Carolinas, Inc., 791 S.E.2d 128,
133 (S.C. 2016).
255 See, e.g., Haasbroek v. Princess Cruise Lines, Ltd., 286 F. Supp. 3d 1352, 1359 (S.D. Fla.
2017) (requiring arbitration of employee’s claims of sexual assault); see also supra text accompanying
notes 67–69.
256 898 F.3d 869, 878 (8th Cir. 2018).
257 Parm v. Bluestem Brands, Inc., No. 15-3437, 2017 WL 1193993, at *1 (D. Minn. Mar. 30, 2017).
258 Id. at *9.
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the bank.259 The plaintiﬀs protested that this interpretation would breed
bizarre results, such as mandating arbitration for “a car accident between a
consumer and . . . the third-party courier who delivers the [Bluestem]
packages, or . . . a situation where a lender’s employee sexually harassed
another employee and the latter had a credit account subject to the
agreement.”260 The Eighth Circuit was not persuaded, reasoning that “[t]he
glaring issue with these hypotheticals is that they in no way inform the
question before the court.”261 Thus, perhaps feeling pressure from the Court,
the appellate panel launched a counteroﬀensive to the opinions that have
rattled oﬀ the perverse consequences of ultra-broad arbitration agreements.
b. Delegation
As noted above, a delegation clause permits the arbitrator to decide
whether a claim falls within the scope of a valid agreement to arbitrate.262
The Court has recently laid the foundation for the widespread use of these
provisions. First, in Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, Rent-A-Center, a
furniture leasing company, required its workers to sign an arbitration
agreement that gave the arbitrator the exclusive power to resolve disputes
about its “interpretation, applicability, enforceability or formation.”263
Antonio Jackson, a former employee, sued Rent-A-Center for
discrimination.264 What followed was a veritable badminton match. Rent-ACenter moved to compel arbitration.265 Jackson responded by arguing that
the “arbitration agreement as a whole” was unconscionable because it limited
discovery and required him to pay half of the arbitrator’s fees.266 And RentA-Center volleyed back by asking the court to enforce the delegation clause
and allow the arbitrator to decide Jackson’s unconscionability challenge.267
The Court held that Jackson needed to arbitrate the very issue of whether
the agreement to arbitrate his lawsuit was binding.268 The Justices relied heavily
on the initial portion of § 2, which makes “[a] written provision . . . to settle by

Id. at *10.
Parm, 898 F.3d at 878.
Id.
See supra text accompanying notes 49, 188–189.
Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 66 (2010).
Id. at 65.
Motion to Dismiss Proceedings and Compel Arbitration at 1, Jackson v. Rent-A-CenterWeste Inc., 2007 WL 7030394 (D. Nev. June 7, 2007) (No. 07-0050).
266 Opposition to Motion to Compel Arbitration and for Attorney Fees at 5, Jackson, 2007 WL
7030394 (No. 07-0050).
267 Reply Points and Authorities in Support of Motion to Dismiss Proceedings and Compel
Arbitration at 2-3, Jackson, 2007 WL 7030394 (No. 07-0050).
268 Jackson, 561 U.S. at 72, 75-76.
259
260
261
262
263
264
265
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arbitration a controversy . . . valid, irrevocable, and enforceable.”269 In a pivotal
maneuver, the Court reasoned that a delegation clause is its own self-contained
“written [arbitration] provision” within the meaning of the statute:
The delegation provision is an agreement to arbitrate threshold issues
concerning the arbitration agreement . . . . An agreement to arbitrate a
gateway issue is simply an additional, antecedent agreement the party seeking
arbitration asks the federal court to enforce, and the FAA operates on this
additional arbitration agreement just as it does on any other.270

In turn, the view that delegation provisions are sovereign arbitration
clauses doomed Jackson’s eﬀorts to remain in court.271 Jackson had only
asserted that the agreement to arbitrate his substantive claims was
unconscionable.272 As a result, he had waived his right to contend that the
delegation clause—a separate agreement to arbitrate whether he had agreed to
arbitrate his substantive claims—was tainted.273
Rent-A-Center created additional incentives for drafters to use infinite
clauses. As noted previously, courts had traditionally refused to permit
arbitrators to entertain “wholly groundless” arguments that an arbitration
clause encompassed a particular claim.274 But the double-barreled combination
of delegation provisions and infinite language seemed to eliminate this
exception. After all, how could a defendant’s argument that an agreement to
arbitrate “all disputes” applies to a particular claim be “wholly groundless”?
Nevertheless, in Douglas v. Regions Bank, the Fifth Circuit applied the
“wholly groundless” exception to an infinite clause.275 The facts of Douglas are
hard to believe. In 2002, Shirley Douglas opened a checking account with Union

Id. at 67 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2018)).
Id. at 68, 70.
Id. at 72-73.
See id. at 72 (“Nowhere in his opposition to Rent-A-Center’s motion to compel arbitration
did [Jackson] even mention the delegation provision.”).
273 Id. at 72-74. As mentioned previously, see supra note 101, the separability doctrine allows
arbitrators to decide challenges to the validity of the container contract, while courts decide
challenges to the arbitration clause itself. Rent-A-Center extended this “Russian nesting dolls”
approach even further by casting delegation provisions as independent arbitration clauses: contracts
within contracts within contracts. Jackson, 561 U.S. at 85 (Stevens, J., dissenting). I have criticized
this maneuver in Horton, supra note 86, at 408-12.
274 See Qualcomm Inc. v. Nokia Corp., 466 F.3d 1366, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (noting that the
court should deny a party’s request for a stay if the arguments are “wholly groundless”); Turi v. Main
Street Adoption Servs., LLP, 633 F.3d 496, 511 (6th Cir. 2011) (requiring that arguments “are at least
arguably covered by the agreement” to go to the arbitrator); see also supra text accompanying notes
108–110.
275 757 F.3d 460, 464 (5th Cir. 2014).
269
270
271
272
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Planters Bank.276 Her agreement with the institution contained a delegation
clause and an arbitration provision that covered “the relationships . . . resulting
from this [a]greement” and included a survival clause.277 Less than a year later,
Douglas closed her account.278 In 2005, Union merged with Regions Bank.279 In
2007, Douglas was injured in a car accident, filed a tort claim, and received a
settlement.280 In 2010, one of Douglas’s lawyers deposited the proceeds into his
client trust account—which happened to be at Regions—and then stole it.281
Douglas sued Regions for negligently failing to prevent the crime.282
Regions moved to compel arbitration under Douglas’s 2002 signature card
with Union Planters.283 Douglas responded that her lawsuit against Regions
did “not touch the Union Planters account in any way or relate back to her
Union Planters account” that had ended nearly a decade ago.284 But Regions
replied that the delegation clause in Douglas’s Union Planters contract
expressly assigned matters of “scope” to the arbitrator.285
Two members of a Fifth Circuit panel rejected Regions’ argument as
“wholly groundless.”286 Judge Smith and Higginsons explained that no
reasonable arbitrator could ﬁnd a link between Douglas’s negligence claim
against Regions and her 2002 checking account with Union Planters.287 As
the majority saw it, “the events leading to Douglas’s claim—a car accident, a
settlement, and embezzlement of the funds through an account that a third
party held with the bank—have nothing to do with her checking account
opened years earlier for only a brief time.”288
But not everybody agreed. The opinion provoked a strong dissent from
Judge Dennis, who cautioned that “the ‘wholly groundless’ test appears to be
contrary to Supreme Court precedent.”289 On cue, in 2017, the Tenth and

276 Plaintiﬀ ’s Memorandum of Authorities Supporting Response to Motion to Compel
Arbitration and to Stay Proceedings, Douglas v. Regions Bank, 2012 WL 5400040 (S.D. Miss. Nov.
5, 2012) (No. 12-00523).
277 Douglas, 757 F.3d at 465 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
278 Regions Bank’s Motion to Compel Arbitration and to Stay Proceedings at 1, Douglas, 2012
WL 5400040 (No. 12-00523).
279 Douglas, 757 F.3d at 461.
280 Id.
281 Id.
282 Id.
283 Id.
284 Plaintiﬀ ’s Memorandum of Authorities, supra note 276, at 9.
285 Motion to Compel Arbitration, supra note 278, at 3.
286 Douglas, 757 F.3d at 464.
287 Id.
288 Id.
289 Id. at 468 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
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Eleventh Circuits cited similar concerns to “decline to adopt the ‘wholly
groundless’ approach.”290
On January 8, 2019, the Supreme Court resolved this dissensus with Henry
Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White Sales, Inc.291 Archer and White sued Henry Schein
for antitrust violations, seeking damages and an injunction.292 However, Archer
and White’s claims were subject to a delegation clause293 and an arbitration
provision that exempted “actions seeking injunctive relief.”294 The Fifth Circuit
refused to allow the arbitrator to decide scope arbitrability, holding that “[w]e
see no plausible argument that the arbitration clause applies here to an ‘action
seeking injunctive relief.’”295 Speaking through Justice Kavanaugh, the Court
reversed.296 Justice Kavanaugh relied heavily on the text of the FAA, which
“does not contain a ‘wholly groundless’ exception.”297 Also, he expressed
concern about the amorphousness of the rule, warning that it “would inevitably
spark collateral litigation (with briefing, argument, and opinion writing) over
whether a seemingly unmeritorious argument for arbitration is wholly
groundless, as opposed to groundless.”298 Thus, the Court abolished the
venerable “wholly groundless” exception to arbitration about arbitration.
II. REGULATING INFINITE CLAUSES
Part I established that the widespread use of inﬁnite clauses and
delegation provisions are amplifying the discord of scope arbitrability.
Accordingly, this Part oﬀers a blueprint for the many courts that are now (or
soon will be) grappling with limitless commitments to arbitrate. It argues that
290 Belnap v. Iasis Healthcare, 844 F.3d 1272, 1286 (10th Cir. 2017); Jones v. Waﬄe House, 866
F.3d 1257, 1269 (11th Cir. 2017) (“We join the Tenth Circuit in declining to adopt what has come to
be known as the wholly groundless exception.”).
291 139 S. Ct. 524, 528 (2019).
292 Id. at 526.
293 The container contract did not include an express delegation clause; instead, it merely
incorporated the rules of the American Arbitration Association. Id.; cf. supra note 189 and
accompanying text (explaining how courts have construed this language to empower the arbitrator to
decide arbitrability).
294 Archer & White Sales, Inc. v. Henry Schein, Inc., 878 F.3d 488, 491 (5th Cir. 2017), vacated,
139 S. Ct. 524 (2019). Archer and White originally sued Pelton and Crane, which was Henry Schein’s
predecessor-in-interest. Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White Sales, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 524, 528 (2019).
The magistrate judge who ﬁrst heard the case allowed Henry Schein to compel arbitration under
the doctrine of equitable estoppel. Archer & White Sales, Inc. v. Henry Schein, Inc., No. 12-0572,
2013 WL 12155243, at *2-3 (E.D. Tex. May 28, 2013), vacated on reconsideration, 2016 WL 7157421 (E.D.
Tex. Dec. 7, 2016), aﬀ ’d, 878 F.3d 488 (5th Cir. 2017), vacated, 139 S. Ct. 524 (2019). The district
court that reviewed the magistrate’s order did not rule on this issue, which meant that it was not
before the Court. Henry Schein, 2016 WL 7157421, at *9.
295 Henry Schein, 878 F.3d at 497.
296 Henry Schein, 139 S. Ct. at 528.
297 Id.
298 Id. at 531.
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even after Concepcion, DIRECTV, Rent-A-Center, and Henry Schein, judges can
continue to nullify some inﬁnite arbitration clauses and delegation
provisions. It brings these insights to bear on several nasty splits in authority,
such as the status of nonparties, FAA preemption, survival, and the boundary
between arbitral and judicial power.
A. The Limits of Infinite Language
This Section explains why inﬁnite language is not always enforceable. It
demonstrates that boundless arbitration clauses can suﬀer from two defects.
The ﬁrst arises from what I call “agreement challenges.” In these cases, the
plaintiﬀ argues that she either has not assented to the container contract, or
has not assented to arbitrate with a particular defendant, or has not assented
to arbitrate for the rest of her life. Although companies have tried to
anticipate these objections through creative draftsmanship, they cannot
overcome the bedrock principle that “[i]f a party has not agreed to arbitrate,
the courts have no authority to mandate that he do so.”299
In a second group of disputes, which I call “scope challenges,” the plaintiﬀ
admits that she has agreed to arbitrate with the defendant, but asserts that her
allegations do not fall within the ambit of the arbitration clause. In this
milieu, I contend that certain claims are so detached from the container
contract that § 2 of the FAA does not apply to them.
1. Agreement Challenges
One reason courts can refuse to enforce inﬁnite language is simple: the
plaintiﬀ has not assented to arbitrate. It is well established that “a party
cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not
agreed so to submit.”300 Some inﬁnite clauses violate this maxim by
attempting to manufacture the indispensable element of contractual consent.
The clearest example of corporations trying to conjure assent out of thin
air involves nonsignatory plaintiﬀs. In general, “only the parties who enter
into a contract have rights and obligations under that contract . . . .”301
However, the FAA absorbs “‘traditional principles’ of state law [that] allow a
contract to be enforced by or against nonparties.”302 For example, the third
party beneﬁciary doctrine binds a nonsignatory to an arbitration clause if the

Bel-Ray Co., Inc. v. Chemrite (Pty) Ltd., 181 F.3d 435, 444 (3d Cir. 1999).
AT&T Techs. v. Commc’ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 648 (1986) (citation omitted).
Pinnacle Health Facilities XXXIII, LP v. Crecca, No. 15-01062, 2016 WL 9818326, at *10
(D.N.M. Nov. 7, 2016).
302 Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 556 U.S. 624, 631 (2009) (quoting 21 R. LORD,
WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS 183 (4th ed. 2001)).
299
300
301
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parties “intended, upon execution of the contract, to bestow a direct, as
opposed to incidental[,] beneﬁt upon [the party].”303 For this to occur, the
agreement must either clearly showcase the parties’ intent to beneﬁt the
nonsignatory304 or advance her interests in some tangible way.305
As several courts have recognized, drafters should not be able to satisfy this
test simply by declaring their desire to bind vast, open-ended groups of
individuals. For example, wireless, cable, and Internet service providers mandate
arbitration not just for the account holder, but for all “users”306 or anyone who
operates one of the provider’s devices.307 Yet as a federal judge in Missouri
recently found, these oblique references do not prove that the contractual
partners truly meant to confer benefits on numerous unnamed third parties.308
Likewise, recall that hospitals, nursing homes, and employers in risky industries
have extended the duty to arbitrate to a signatory’s “parent, spouse, sibling,
child, guardian, executor, legal representative, administrator or heirs.”309 Courts
in jurisdictions that treat wrongful death claims as independent have ignored
this language.310 As the Kentucky Supreme Court has explained, the mere fact
that a contract says that a nonparty is bound does not make it true:

303 Daphne Auto., LLC v. E. Shore Neurology Clinic, Inc., 245 So. 3d 599, 604 (Ala. 2017)
(quoting Custom Performance, Inc. v. Dawson, 57 So. 3d 90, 97 (Ala. 2010)). Companies also often
use the doctrine of equitable estoppel to try to bind nonsignatory plaintiffs. That rule applies
“when the signatory to a written agreement containing an arbitration clause must rely on the terms
of the . . . agreement in asserting its claims against the nonsignatory.” Am. Bankers Ins. Grp. v.
Long, 453 F.3d 623, 627-28 (4th Cir. 2006) (quoting Brantley v. Republic Mortgage Ins. Co., 424
F.3d 392, 395-96 (4th Cir. 2005)). Because equitable estoppel is rooted in the plaintiffs’ conduct—
not the text of the contract—it is not relevant for my purposes.
304 See Tucker v. Vincent, 471 S.W.3d 787, 796 n.5 (Mo. Ct. App. 2015) (“To be bound as a thirdparty beneficiary, the terms of the contract must clearly express intent to benefit that party . . . .”).
Although “[t]he absence of the third party’s name from the contract is not fatal . . . the record must
provide evidence that the party’s identity was ascertainable from either the terms of the contract or
the circumstances surrounding its creation.” Sakyi v. Estee Lauder Cos., 308 F. Supp. 3d 366, 384
(D.D.C. 2018) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
305 See, e.g., Suh v. Superior Court, 105 Cal. Rptr. 3d 585, 594 (Ct. App. 2010) (holding that
the plaintiﬀs were not third party beneﬁciaries because “[t]here is no evidence . . . that plaintiﬀs
actually derived any beneﬁts” from the contract); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 302, cmt. a, Reporter’s Notes (instructing courts to “consider the circumstances surrounding the
transaction as well as the actual language of the contract”).
306 Comcast Agreement for Residential Services, XFINITY, https://www.xﬁnity.com/corporate/
customers/policies/subscriberagreement [https://perma.cc/QE4L-4724] (last visited Jan. 2, 2020);
Cricket Wireless Terms and Conditions of Service, CRICKET, https://www.cricketwireless.com/terms
[https://perma.cc/BAT2-3VE3] (last updated Aug. 11, 2019).
307 E.g., Sprint Terms and Conditions, supra note 174.
308 See James Shackelford Heating & Cooling, LC v. AT&T Corp., No. 17-663, 2017 WL
6813715, at *3 (W.D. Mo. Nov. 21, 2017) (explaining that the mere fact a party derives an incidental
beneﬁt from a contract does not necessarily make it an intended third party beneﬁciary).
309 Lawrence v. Beverly Manor, 273 S.W.3d 525, 526 (Mo. 2009) (en banc).
310 See supra text accompanying notes 164–165.
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[A]s interesting as life might be if we could bind one another to contracts
merely by referring to each other in them, we are not persuaded that a nonsignatory who receives no substantive beneﬁt under a contract may be bound
to the contract’s procedural provisions, including arbitration clauses, merely
by being referred to in the contract . . . . Arbitration is a matter of contract,
however; it is something the contracting parties, or their proxies, must agree
to. It is not something that one party may simply impose upon another.311

Indeed, because “nonpart[ies] never agree[] to [a] contract’s terms,” these
inﬁnite clauses try to generate synthetic consent.312
The absence of an agreement to arbitrate also explains why the FAA does
not preempt these holdings. Predictably, ﬁrms are citing Concepcion and
DIRECTV and arguing that § 2 “require[s] arbitration of . . . wrongful-death
claims.”313 In fact, in March 2018, a district court in Massachusetts opined
that refusing to enforce arbitration clauses against nonsignatories violates the
statute because it “has the indirect but practical eﬀect of singling arbitration
agreements out for special treatment.”314 This logic is ﬂawed. Arbitration
agreements are just words on a page unless a plaintiﬀ has assented to the
container contract. As the Sixth Circuit has noted, disputes involving
nonsignatory plaintiﬀs are “not about preemption”; rather, they are “about
consent.”315 Without assent to arbitrate, the FAA never enters the picture.
The analysis with respect to some nonsignatory defendants is similar.
Suppose Plaintiﬀ P signs a contract with Entity A that contains an arbitration
provision. Later, P sues A, Executive B (who works for A), and Firm C (a
subsidiary of A). In general, because nonparties “cannot enforce [arbitration
provisions] against one who is a party,”316 B and C must defend P’s lawsuit in

311 Ping v. Beverly Enters., Inc., 376 S.W.3d 581, 599-600 (Ky. 2012); see also Richmond Health
Facilities v. Nichols, 811 F.3d 192, 197 (6th Cir. 2016) (“That the Agreement purports to extend to
wrongful-death claims makes no diﬀerence.”); Duenas v. Life Care Ctrs. of Am., Inc., 336 P.3d 763,
771-72 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2014) (holding that “express language in the agreement purporting to bind
the statutory heirs to arbitrate their wrongful death claims” is not enforceable (quoting Estate of
Decamacho ex rel. Guthrie v. La Solana Care & Rehab, Inc., 316 P.3d 607, 614 n.5 (Ariz. Ct. App.
2014))); Bybee v. Abdulla, 189 P.3d 40, 49 (Utah 2008) (“While the intention to bind [the plaintiﬀ]
is clear, it is less apparent that the obligation to arbitrate was a ‘separate and distinct beneﬁt’
bestowed by [the signatories] on her.”).
312 BML Stage Lighting, Inc. v. Mayﬂower Transit, Inc., 14 S.W.3d 395, 400 (Tex. App. 2000).
313 Raber v. Emeritus at Marietta, 49 N.E.3d 345, 349 (Ohio Ct. App. 2016); see also, e.g., Brief
of Appellants at 19, Richmond Health Facilities v. Nichols, 811 F.3d 192 (6th Cir. 2016) (No. 155062), 2015 WL 2345348; Brief of Appellant at 13, Carter v. SSC Odin Operating Co., 976 N.E.2d
344 (Ill. 2012) (No. 113204), 2012 WL 8264378.
314 GGNSC Chestnut Hill LLC v. Schrader, No. 16-10525, 2018 WL 1582555, at *8 (D. Mass.
Mar. 31, 2018).
315 Richmond Health Facilities, 811 F.3d at 201.
316 Lawson v. Life of the S. Ins. Co., 648 F.3d 1166, 1167 (11th Cir. 2011).
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court. After all, P may have agreed to arbitrate with A, but she never agreed
to arbitrate with B and C.
The leading exception to this rule is alternative estoppel,317 and businesses
are increasingly relying on infinite language to try to invoke it.318 Alternative
estoppel applies when (1) the plaintiff’s claims are “intertwined” with the
container contract and (2) a nonsignatory defendant has “a ‘close relationship’
with a signatory.”319 One way to satisfy the “close relationship” prong is to show
that “the non-signatory party is ‘linked textually’ to the underlying contract.”320
Accordingly, drafters are trying to build “textual[]” bridges to a dizzying array
of nonparties.321 For example, Citibank’s arbitration agreement covers “[c]laims
made . . . against anyone connected with [Citibank].”322 Through Citibank’s
rewards program and branded cards, the company partners with Amazon, Best
Buy, ExxonMobil, The Home Depot, L.L. Bean, Jet Blue, Macy’s, Sears, Shell,
and Virgin Atlantic.323 Thus, at least on paper, a single arbitration clause can
span enormous sectors of the business world.
However, deferring to the contractual text would ﬂout “the black letter
rule that the obligation to arbitrate depends on consent.”324 Indeed, the basis
for alternative estoppel is a contract “implied in fact”: the conclusion that two
defendants are so entwined that by agreeing to arbitrate against the signatory,
the plaintiﬀ tacitly “extend[ed] its agreement to arbitrate to [the
nonsignatory].”325 It would be a rank ﬁction to construe the act of opening a
317 Alternative estoppel, a variation of equitable estoppel, is the idea that a plaintiff must
arbitrate any claim that either (1) relies heavily on the terms of the container contract, Grigson v.
Creative Artists Agency, L.L.C., 210 F.3d 524, 528 (5th Cir. 2000), or (2) alleges that a nonsignatory
and a signatory engaged in concerted wrongdoing, Boyd v. Homes of Legend, Inc., 981 F. Supp. 1423,
1433 (M.D. Ala. 1997), abrogated by Davis v. S. Energy Homes, Inc., 305 F.3d 1268 (11th Cir. 2002).
318 Nonsignatories also try to invoke arbitration clauses based on incorporation by reference,
assumption, agency, alter ego, and third-party beneficiary principles. See In re Kellogg Brown & Root,
Inc., 166 S.W.3d 732, 739 (Tex. 2005) (recognizing these as the “theories, arising out of common
principles of contract and agency law, that may bind non-signatories to arbitration agreements”).
319 Jody James Farms, JV v. Altman Grp., Inc., 547 S.W.3d 624, 639 (Tex. 2018) (quoting
Thomson-CSF, S.A. v. Am. Arbitration Ass’n, 64 F.3d 773, 779 (2d Cir. 1995)).
320 Temple v. Best Rate Holdings LLC, 360 F. Supp.3d 1289, 1310 (M.D. Fla. 2018) (quoting
Choctaw Generation Ltd. P’ship v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 271 F.3d 403, 407 (2d Cir. 2001)). A
“close relationship” also exists if the plaintiﬀ “understood the extent of the non-signatory’s
involvement with respect to the signatories’ relationship.” Id.
321 Id.
322 White v. Sunoco Inc., 189 F. Supp. 3d 486, 493 (E.D. Pa. 2016), aff ’d, 870 F.3d 257 (3d
Cir. 2017).
323 Consumer Businesses, CITI, https://www.citigroup.com/citi/about/consumer_businesses.html
[https://perma.cc/Y2YA-3RPK] (last visited Jan. 2, 2020); Brian Graham, Citi ThankYou Rewards Program
Review (Including Transfer Partners!), UPGRADEDPOINTS (July 13, 2019), https://upgradedpoints.com/
citi-thankyou-rewards-review/ [https://perma.cc/V4LM-XWLW].
324 E. W. Bank v. Bingham, 992 F. Supp. 2d 1130, 1134 (W.D. Wash. 2014).
325 Sokol Holdings, Inc. v. BMB Munai, Inc., 542 F.3d 354, 361 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing Grigson
v. Creative Artists Agency, L.L.C., 210 F.3d 524, 533 (5th Cir. 2000) (Dennis, J., dissenting)).
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line of credit as agreeing to arbitrate against airlines, big box stores, online
retailers, and oil companies.326
This insight animates Wexler v. AT & T Corp., one of the most interesting
contemporary opinions dealing with inﬁnite language.327 In 2008, Dr. Eve
Wexler went online and signed up for wireless service with AT&T Mobility,
LLC (“Mobility”).328 Dr. Wexler’s contract included an arbitration clause that
covered “all disputes and claims” that she might have with Mobility or its
“aﬃliates.”329 In 2014, Dr. Wexler began to receive harassing calls and text
messages from AT&T Corporation (“AT&T Corp.”) related to the account
of a stranger named Paul MacPherson.330 Dr. Wexler ﬁled a class action suit
against AT&T Corp. for violating the TCPA.331 AT&T Corp. asked a federal
judge in New York to compel arbitration under Mobility’s contract because
the plain meaning of “aﬃliate” is “[a] corporation that is related to another
corporation by shareholdings or other means of control,” and both AT&T
Corp. and Mobility “are wholly-owned subsidiaries of AT&T Inc.”332 The
court denied the motion, reasoning that Dr. Wexler had not objectively
manifested an intent to arbitrate with AT&T Corp.:
Notwithstanding the literal meaning of the clause’s language, no reasonable
person would think that checking a box accepting the “terms and conditions”
necessary to obtain cell phone service would obligate them to arbitrate literally
every possible dispute he or she might have with the service provider, let alone
all of the affiliates under AT&T Inc.’s corporate umbrella—including those
who provide services unrelated to cell phone coverage.333

326 See White, 189 F. Supp. 3d at 493 (rejecting a Citibank rewards partner’s attempt to invoke
the “anyone connected with [Citibank]” language); Jody James Farms, JV v. Altman Grp., Inc., 547
S.W.3d 624, 640 (Tex. 2018) (reasoning that alternative estoppel typically applies when there is at
least “some corporate aﬃliation between a signatory and nonsignatory, not just a working
relationship”). But see Moss v. BMO Harris Bank, N.A., 24 F. Supp. 3d 281, 289-91 (E.D.N.Y. 2014)
(holding that banks that facilitated illegal payday loans were closely related to the lenders and thus
could invoke alternative estoppel), motion for relief from judgment granted, 114 F. Supp. 3d 61 (E.D.N.Y.
2015), aﬀ ’d sub nom. Moss v. First Premier Bank, 835 F.3d 260 (2d Cir. 2016).
327 211 F. Supp. 3d 500, 504 (E.D.N.Y. 2016).
328 Defendant AT&T Corp.’s Memorandum in Support of Its Motion to Compel Arbitration at 12, Wexler, 211 F. Supp. 3d 500 (No. 15-0686), 2015 WL 5998751 [hereinafter AT&T’s Motion to Compel].
329 Id. at 2.
330 Wexler, 211 F. Supp. 3d at 502.
331 Amended Complaint—Class Action, Wexler, 211 F. Supp. 3d 500 (No. 15-0686), 2015
WL 1883842.
332 AT&T’s Motion to Compel, supra note 328, at 8 & n.7 (quoting Aﬃliate, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009)).
333 Wexler, 211 F. Supp. 3d at 504.
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The reasoning is spot-on. AT&T, Inc. is the parent of a staggering ninetyeight separate ﬁrms, from Ameritech to HBO to Yellowpages.com.334 Thus,
AT&T Corp.’s theory that Mobility’s arbitration provision “includes all
members of the AT&T corporate family”335 stretches “agreeing” to arbitrate
past the breaking point.
Finally, survival provisions raise questions about the duration of the
plaintiff’s consent to arbitrate. So far, courts have uniformly enforced arbitral
survival clauses. Even if the plaintiff sues for wrongdoing that occurred after the
agreement expired, the existence of survivorship language has been
dispositive.336 For example, in Townsend v. Pinnacle Entertainment, Inc., Kim
Townsend entered into a two-year employment contract with Pinnacle, a casino,
in April 2007.337 The contract included an arbitration clause that stated that it
“shall survive the expiration of this Agreement.”338 After the contract lapsed in
April 2009, Townsend continued to work for Pinnacle.339 In November 2009,
Pinnacle dismissed Townsend, and she sued for wrongful termination.340 The
Third Circuit sent her claim to arbitration, explaining that the survival provision
“evidences the intent of the parties to arbitrate all disputes arising out of the
employment relationship between Ms. Townsend and Pinnacle, not simply
those which arise during the term of the 2007 Agreement.”341
334 Stephen Johnson, 98 Companies AT&T-Time Warner Will Own After the $85 Billion Merger,
BIG THINK (June 13, 2018), https://bigthink.com/stephen-johnson/here-are-all-the-companies-atttime-warner-will-own-after-the-merger-2 [https://perma.cc/7PRP-7Y2D].
335 Wexler, 211 F. Supp. 3d at 504; accord Revitch v. DirecTV, LLC, No. 18-01127, 2018 WL
4030550, at *13 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2018) (rejecting DirecTV’s attempt to invoke Mobility’s
arbitration clause as one of Mobility’s “aﬃliate[s]” because the parties “did not intend to enter into
an agreement that would cover the claim asserted against DirecTV in this action”).
336 See Crooks v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 312 F. Supp. 3d 932, 938 (S.D. Cal. 2018) (“[B]y its
express terms, even if the Contract was terminated as a result of Plaintiff ’s bankruptcy discharge, the
arbitration provision survives.”); Wiitanen v. Midland Funding LLC, No. 17-534, 2017 WL 7035757,
at *3 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 26, 2017) (compelling arbitration of Fair Debt Collection Practices Act claim
that allegedly arose after the termination of a credit agreement “because the arbitration provision
contains an explicit survival clause”); Treinish v. BorrowersFirst, Inc., No. 17-1371, 2017 WL 3971854,
at *1 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 8, 2017) (ordering arbitration of TCPA and state consumer protection claims
“because the arbitration provision survives any alleged termination and compels Plaintiff to
arbitrate”). However, the absence of an arbitration-specific survival provision does not always exempt
a plaintiff ’s post-expiration claims from arbitration. See Huffman v. Hilltop Cos., 747 F.3d 391, 398
(6th Cir. 2014) (compelling arbitration even though arbitration was not mentioned as a duty that
survived the termination of the agreement). But see Stevens-Bratton v. TruGreen, Inc, 675 F. App’x
563, 570-71 (6th Cir. 2017) (relying in part on the absence of survival clause to hold that plaintiff ’s
TCPA claim based on post-expiration phone calls did not “arise under the contract”).
337 457 F. App’x 205, 206 (3d Cir. 2012).
338 Id.
339 Id.
340 Id.
341 Id. Confusingly, courts sometimes rely on survivorship language even when the plaintiﬀ ’s
claim arises out of a lapsed container contract. For example, in Milfort v. Comcast Cable
Communications Management LLC, 309 F. Supp. 3d 1268, 1272-73 (S.D. Fla. 2018), the court

2020]

Infinite Arbitration Clauses

677

Despite this island of doctrinal calm, trouble lurks on the horizon. All of
the decisions that have enforced survival provisions have involved
wrongdoing that occurred shortly after the container contract ended.
Townsend is pretty typical: Pinnacle ﬁred Townsend just seven months after
their formal employment contract expired.342 Arguably, Townsend should
have expected that her arbitration commitment would have lasted that long.
Nevertheless, now that survival provisions have become common, defendants
will likely start trying to compel arbitration of claims that stem from conduct
that takes place many years—perhaps even decades—after the conclusion of
the container contract.
Allowing a single line of text in an adhesion contract to waive an
individual’s right to access the courts forever would do violence to the tenet
that arbitration is consensual. Indeed, the common law has long bent over
backwards to deem seemingly-perpetual contracts to be terminable within a
reasonable time.343 As the Mississippi Supreme Court explained in 1876, this
approach helps square the language of the agreement with what the parties
truly intended:
[C]ontracts . . . will not be enforced as imposing an eternal and never-ending
burden. An agreement to furnish a support or service, or a particular
commodity, at a speciﬁed price, or to do a certain thing without speciﬁcation
as to time, will be construed either as terminable at pleasure, or as implying
that the thing to be done shall be performed within a reasonable time, and
the obligation will cease within the same limitation. Any other theory than
this would subject incautious persons—a class, it may be remarked, which
includes the majority of mankind—into life-long servitudes . . . .344
compelled arbitration of plaintiﬀ ’s allegations that the defendant illegally accessed his credit report
when he signed up for cable service. The court held that it did not matter that the plaintiﬀ had
cancelled his account before he ﬁled the lawsuit because “the Subscriber Agreement contains a
survivability clause.” Id. However, the survival provision should have been irrelevant. Because the
dispute involved “facts and occurrences that arose before expiration,” it arose under the container
contract and should have been arbitrable even without a survivorship clause. Litton Fin. Printing
Div. v. N.L.R.B., 501 U.S. 190, 206 (1991); see also supra text accompanying notes 166–167.
342 Townsend, 457 F. App’x at 206.
343 See, e.g., Killearn Props., Inc. v. City of Tallahassee, 366 So. 2d 172, 182 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1979) (holding that the contract “was for an indeﬁnite period but not perpetual” and was “terminable
within a reasonable time”); Rico Indus., Inc. v. TLC Grp., Inc., 6 N.E.3d 415, 420 (Ill. App. Ct.
2014) (“[P]erpetual contracts are contrary to public policy.”); Glacial Plains Coop. v. Chippewa
Valley Ethanol Co., 912 N.W.2d 233, 237 (Minn. 2018) (“A contract of indeﬁnite duration is
terminable at will upon reasonable notice to the other party after a reasonable time has passed.”);
MS Real Estate Holdings, LLC v. Donald P. Fox Family Tr., 864 N.W.2d 83, 92-93 (Wis. 2015)
(“We are ‘reluctant to interpret a contract as providing for a perpetual contractual right unless the
intention of the contracting parties to provide for the same is clearly stated.’” (quoting Capital Invs.,
Inc. v. Whitehall Packing Co., 280 N.W.2d 254 (Wis. 1979))).
344 Echols v. New Orleans, Jackson & Great N. R.R. Co., 52 Miss. 610, 614 (1876).
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Although sophisticated parties in negotiated deals can override this
presumption by using “clear and unequivocal terms,”345 no authority suggests
that fine print can generate this robust form of assent. And in any event, most
arbitral survivorship provisions do not unambiguously purport to be perpetual.
They state only that the obligation to arbitrate “survives” the container
contract, not that it survives until the bitter end of the world.346 Thus, courts
should conclude that forced arbitration clauses have an implicit shelf life.347
2. Scope Challenges
As noted, in other disputes over inﬁnite language, there is no doubt that
the plaintiﬀ entered into an operative agreement to arbitrate against all
relevant parties, but it is unclear whether this agreement is broad enough to
cover a speciﬁc claim.348 Counterintuitively, this Section argues that the
primary check on corporate power in this sphere is the text of the FAA.
Because inﬁnite provisions often exceed the foundation laid by Congress,
scope challenges are primarily governed by state law.
Section 2—the statute’s centerpiece—contains an important limit:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy
thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, . . . shall be valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract.349

As the italicized words reveal, the statute only governs agreements to
arbitrate “controvers[ies] . . . arising out of [the container] contract.”350 In turn,
“to arise” has long been understood as “[t]o originate; to stem (from) . . . [or]
[t]o result (from).”351 However, inﬁnite arbitration clauses purport to cover

345 Wyo. Valley W. Sch. Dist. v. Nw. Sch. Dist., 695 A.2d 949, 953 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1997); see
also Armstrong Bus. Servs., Inc. v. H & R Block, 96 S.W.3d 867, 875 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002) (“[A]
contract will not be construed to confer a right or impose an obligation in perpetuity unless the
language of the contract compels such construction.”).
346 See supra text accompanying notes 186–187.
347 Cf. Ashbury Heights Capital, LLC v. FactSet Research Sys. Inc., No. 145806, 2016 WL
4368146, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 16, 2016) (holding that the defendant’s argument that “the parties
are perpetually bound to arbitrate any dispute” is “untenable and surely does not reﬂect the original
intent of the parties”).
348 See supra Section II.A.
349 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2018) (emphasis added).
350 Id.
351 Arise, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019); see also Rouse v. Greyhound Rent-A-Car,
Inc., 506 F.2d 410, 414 n.3 (5th Cir. 1975) (“The term ‘arising out of ’ is ordinarily understood to mean
originating from, incident to, or connected with the item in question.”); Friedman, supra note 50, at
1037-39 (providing more detail about the distinction between “arising out of ” and “relating to”).
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allegations without regard to whether they ﬂow from the container contract.
Indeed, they attempt to suck into their maw all causes of action—no matter
their source. Because § 2 requires that a claim “arise[s] out of ” the container
contract, it does not apply to the inﬁnite portions of these clauses. I will refer
to this as the “contractual nexus” theory.
Section 2’s requirement of a contractual nexus was a deliberate choice. The
FAA was modeled on arbitration statutes that New York and New Jersey
passed in the early 1920s.352 Section 2 of the FAA thus mirrored the
corresponding provisions of these state laws with one striking exception. New
York’s legislation validated agreements to arbitrate any cause of action “arising
between the parties to the contract.”353 Conversely, policymakers in New Jersey
established two rules: they made predispute arbitration clauses enforceable to
cover lawsuits “arising out the contract,” but permitted parties to submit
existing claims to arbitration for “the violation of any . . . obligation.”354 Thus,
New York’s entire statute and New Jersey’s approach to post-dispute
agreements allowed infinite clauses. Indeed, even if a complaint bore no
relationship to the container contract, it nevertheless was a controversy
“arising between the parties to the contract” and sought redress for “the
violation of any . . . obligation.” However, Congress decided not to go down
this route. Instead, it chose the narrowest of the three options by following
New Jersey’s approach to predispute clauses and requiring that a claim “aris[e]
out of [the container] contract.”355
The FAA’s drafting history also bolsters the contractual nexus theory. In
January 1924, the Joint Committee of the Subcommittees on the Judiciary of the
House and Senate debated a different version of § 2, which provided:
A written provision in any contract or maritime transaction or transaction
involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising
between the parties out of such contract or transaction . . . shall be valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract.356

This version of the FAA would have governed arbitration agreements to
arbitrate claims that arose not only from the container contract, but also from
“any . . . transaction.” The word “transaction” is “broader than ‘contact’”
352 S. REP. NO. 68-536, at 3 (1924); IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW 4243 (1992).
353 In re Shima & Co., 186 N.Y.S. 154, 155 (Sup. Ct. 1920) (quoting Arbitration Law, ch. 275,
§ 2, 1920 N.Y. Laws 5, 8).
354 Act of Mar. 21, 1923, ch. 134, § 1, 1923 N.J. Laws 291, 291 (emphasis added).
355 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2018).
356 Arbitration of Interstate Commercial Disputes: Joint Hearings on S. 1005 and H.R. 646 Before the
Subcomms. of the Comms. on the Judiciary, 68th Cong. 2 (1924) (emphasis added).
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because it “is synonymous with ‘act,’ ‘action,’ ‘aﬀair,’ ‘business,’ and the like.”357
As a result, a “[c]ontract is a transaction, but a transaction is not necessarily
a contract.”358 Thus, if the January 1924 draft had passed, § 2 would have
covered agreements to arbitrate claims that emerged from the sprawling
universe of the parties’ relationship, rather than the narrower subject matter
of the container contract.359 But Congress ultimately deleted the phrase
“transaction involving commerce,” conﬁning the FAA to agreements to
arbitrate claims “arising . . . out of . . . a [container] contract.”360
There are two powerful counterarguments to the contractual nexus theory.
First, there is tension between the theory and settled law. Although the Court
has never grappled with the “arising out of ” language in § 2, it has instructed
lower courts to err on the side of sending disputes to the private forum.361
Thus, as noted, courts often hold that broad arbitration clauses cover lawsuits
that merely “relate to,” rather than “aris[e] out of,” the container contract.362
“Relate to” encompasses slightly more territory than “aris[e] out of ”: it means
“to have bearing or concern; to pertain; refer; to bring into association with or
connection with.”363 For example, violations of antitrust and workplace
discrimination laws “relate to” but do not necessarily “aris[e] out of ” the
container contract. Each allegation hinges on conduct that is far removed from
the agreement, such as a conspiracy to fix prices or a prejudiced employment
decision. The fact that these claims are arbitrable although they only brush up
against the terms of the deal seems to belie my thesis.

357 Metro. Cas. Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Lehigh Valley R.R. Co., 109 A. 743, 744 (N.J. Ct. Err. &
App. 1920).
358 Id.
359 Eagled-eyed readers may note that the FAA validates agreements in “any maritime
transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a
controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction.” 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2018). Based on the
italicized text, one might argue that the statute does, in fact, apply to arbitration clauses in
“transaction[s]”—not just “contract[s].” However, the word “transaction” refers back to the earlier
mention of “maritime transaction[s].” See Friedman, supra note 50, at 1041-44. Thus, § 2 ultimately
insists that a claim “aris[e] out of ” the container contract.
360 9 U.S.C. § 2. Congress likely removed the phrase “transaction involving commerce”
because the January 1924 draft attempted to regulate “contracts” that did not “involve [interstate]
commerce,” which would have exceeded its authority under the Commerce Clause. See Agostini
Bros. Bldg. Corp. v. United States, 142 F.2d 854, 856 (4th Cir. 1944) (“[I]t was realized that Congress
had no power to legislate with respect to the validity of contracts generally but only as to the validity
of those which related to matters subject to its control,” namely those contracts that “cover only
maritime transactions and transactions involving interstate and foreign commerce.”).
361 See supra text accompanying notes 120–123.
362 See supra text accompanying notes 150–154.
363 Relate, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990); see also Friedman, supra note 50, at 103740 (observing that the FAA uses the phrase “relating to” elsewhere “to essentially mean ‘having
something to do with’”).
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Second, one might justify glossing over the FAA’s text on the grounds
that it prevents claim-splitting. Courts have long interpreted arbitration
clauses expansively to minimize the burden on the parties. Where two claims
share a common factual nucleus, rigidly following Congress’s blueprint could
slice cases in half.364 Indeed, allegations that “arise out of ” the container
contract would be arbitrated, while those that merely “relate to” the
agreement would proceed in the judicial system. Sending the entire dispute
to arbitration avoids this ineﬃcient result.
Nevertheless, it is one thing to blur the deﬁnition of words in a statute
and another thing to ignore them entirely. There is a thin line between “aris[e]
out of ” and “relate to,” but there is a chasm between “aris[e] out of ” and
“unrelated to.” Accordingly, broad arbitration clauses have a plausible textual
hook in § 2, whereas inﬁnite provisions do not.365
In addition, courts implicitly acknowledge that § 2’s authority diminishes
as the gap between the lawsuit and the container contract widens. As noted,
when judges apply the “touch matters” or “significant relationship” tests,
they liberally invoke doctrines such as unconscionability, reasonable
expectations, and contra proferentem.366 The fact that state law plays an
outsized role in this sphere suggests that the FAA’s power fades when a claim
only “relates to” the agreement.
Finally, policy considerations cut both ways. Recognizing that infinite
clauses exceed the scope of § 2 would not mean that they are unenforceable.
Instead, it would empower state law to control the issue. Most jurisdictions have
364 Miletic v. Holm & Wonsild, 294 F. Supp. 772, 776 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (“Unless the claims are
resolved by one tribunal, the parties will be put to the expense and duplication occasioned by
arbitration of one claim before one tribunal and trial of the other in this Court.”). Similarly, even
before the FAA, courts cited pragmatic concerns to construe submissions to arbitration broadly. See
supra text accompanying notes 92–95.
365 Admittedly, there is another way in which the contractual nexus theory does not map on neatly
to settled law. Parties sometimes sign multiple contracts at the same time, only one of which contains an
arbitration clause. Yet courts generally hold that the arbitration provision governs disputes related not
just to the container contract, but to one of the non-container contracts. See, e.g., Woodville Enter., LLC
v. Kokosing Materials, Inc., 94 N.E.3d 1053, 1057-58 (Ohio Ct. App. 2017) (finding that arbitration clause
in one agreement also applied to other contracts involved in the dispute). However, this is not fatal to
the contractual nexus theory. For one, under the common law, “[d]ocuments ‘pertaining to the same
transaction may be read together,’ even if they are executed at different times and do not reference each
other, and ‘courts may construe all the documents as if they were part of a single, unified instrument.’”
In re Laibe Corp., 307 S.W.3d 314, 317 (Tex. 2010) (quoting Fort Worth Indep. Sch. Dist. v. City of Fort
Worth, 22 S.W.3d 831, 840 (Tex. 2000)). Thus, there is no bright-line distinction between multiple related
contracts. In addition, cases that apply the arbitration provision in one agreement to a claim related to a
related agreement can be understood as a soft-focused view of the “contract” that a dispute must “aris[e]
out of” under § 2. Just as courts have construed “aris[e] out of” to include “created to,” they have stretched
“contract” to include several agreements that are intertwined in “one overall transaction.” Nestle Waters
N. Am., Inc. v. Bollman, 505 F.3d 498, 503 (6th Cir. 2007).
366 See supra text accompanying notes 124–128.
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copied New York’s trailblazing arbitration legislation and have passed statutes
that validate predispute agreements to arbitrate “any controversy . . . between
the parties.”367 Thus, even if § 2 of the FAA does not apply, state arbitration
legislation can provide the infrastructure to enforce infinite language. Whether
state courts and policymakers decide to honor infinite provisions or strike them
down, the contractual nexus theory would allow them to speak in a field where
their voices are often silenced.

To summarize, scope challenges fall into one of three tiers. First, some
claims ﬂow from the formation, interpretation, or performance of the
container contract. These allegations trigger § 2 and are subject to the full
force of the FAA. Second, other causes of action are indirectly connected to
the parties’ agreement. Although Congress did not intend the FAA to govern
these complaints, the Court’s muscular interpretation of the statute has
extended it into this sphere. However, because the FAA applies only in
diluted form when causes of action relate indirectly to the parties’ contract,
it leaves room for courts to invoke contrary principles from state contract law.
367 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1501 (2019); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-408 (2019); IDAHO
CODE § 7-901 (2019); IND. CODE § 34-57-2-1 (2019); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 5927 (2019);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 251, § 1 (2019); MO. REV. STAT. § 435.465 (2019); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 7303 (2019); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-25A-1 (2019); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 5652 (2019); VA.
CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.01 (2019). Admittedly, some state arbitration statutes govern all disputes
between the parties but also contain idiosyncratic exemptions and therefore do not apply to broad
arbitration clauses in all contexts. See, e.g., 710 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1 (2020) (excluding certain health
care disputes); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 417.050 (West 2019) (excluding employment agreements and
certain insurance agreements). For the argument that Congress should amend the FAA to conform
to these state laws, see Stephen J. Ware, Interstate Arbitration: Chapter 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act, in
ARBITRATION LAW IN AMERICA: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 88, 104-05 (2006).

2020]

Infinite Arbitration Clauses

683

Third, still other lawsuits have no relationship with the parties’ contract.
These are the disputes that inﬁnite clauses purport to govern. But because
these provisions exceed the metes and bounds of § 2, judges can ignore the
constraints of federal law and freely deem them to be unconscionable,
construe them against the drafter, or ﬁnd that they exceed the boundaries of
a consumer’s or employee’s reasonable expectations.
B. Delegation
The previous Sections also have important implications for delegation
clauses. As noted, in Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White Sales, Inc., the Court
abolished the “wholly groundless” rule, reasoning that “[w]hen the parties’
contract delegates the arbitrability question to an arbitrator, the courts must
respect the parties’ decision as embodied in the contract.”368 This sweeping
statement appears to give drafters carte blanche to use infinite arbitration clauses
and delegation provisions to funnel all questions of scope arbitrability to
arbitrators. But this Section contends that Henry Schein is not as groundbreaking
as it seems, because some arbitrability issues are inherently nondelegable.
The distinction between “agreement” and “scope” challenges is the key to
understanding why Henry Schein only goes so far. Henry Schein involved a
textbook scope challenge: Archer and White contended that an arbitration
clause that exempted claims for injunctive relief did not govern an antitrust
claim that sought an injunction.369 To see why Archer and White needed to
arbitrate this question, recall that Rent-A-Center held that delegation clauses are
arbitration clauses within arbitration clauses: contracts to arbitrate whether the
parties agreed to arbitrate the merits of a complaint.370 Under this rubric, a
plaintiff in a scope challenge (1) denies that she agreed to arbitrate a substantive
claim, but (2) concedes that she agreed to arbitrate whether she agreed to arbitrate
this claim. For example, even though Archer and White objected that it did not
agree to arbitrate a lawsuit that sought injunctive relief, it did not try to persuade
the Court that (1) it never manifested assent to the delegation clause, (2) Henry
Schein lacked standing to enforce the delegation clause, or (3) the delegation
clause had lapsed.371 Thus, because Archer and White did not attack the
139 S. Ct. 524, 528 (2019).
Id.
See supra text accompanying notes 263–273.
The fact that Henry Schein was not a signatory to the container contract had dropped out of
the case before it reached the Court. See supra note 294. In addition, because the agreement only
incorporated the AAA Rules and did not feature an explicit delegation clause, the Court “express[ed]
no view about whether the contract at issue in this case in fact delegated the arbitrability question to
an arbitrator.” Henry Schein, 139 S. Ct. at 531; see also supra note 293. On remand, the Fifth Circuit held
that the parties did not “evince[] a ‘clear and unmistakable’ intent to delegate arbitrability.” Archer &
White Sales, Inc. v. Henry Schein, Inc., 935 F.3d 274, 282 (5th Cir. 2019). The court reasoned that the
368
369
370
371
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delegation clause, Justice Kavanaugh enforced it, instructing lower courts to
allow arbitrators to decide even frivolous scope challenges.372
Critically, however, Henry Schein does not address agreement challenges.
Cases involving a challenge to the agreement to arbitrate are profoundly
different than scope challenges. Recall that because arbitration arises from the
parties’ consent, arbitrators cannot decide whether the parties agreed to arbitrate:
If an arbitrator must determine whether a valid arbitration agreement exists
as to the parties before it, a conundrum arises: “[A]n arbitrator would be put
in the position of deciding whether he was authorized to decide the parties’
dispute, concluding either that he was not authorized, a logical circularity, or
that he was, and raising himself by his own bootstraps.”373

For this reason, the FAA “preserves for the courts any claim at all that
necessarily calls an agreement to arbitrate into question.”374 And that is
precisely what an agreement challenge to a delegation provision does.
Consider nonsignatory plaintiffs. Suppose an individual files a wrongful
death action and the defendant responds by invoking a delegation clause in its
contract with the decedent. Even after Henry Schein, a judge in a state that treats
wrongful death claims as “independent” must disregard the delegation provision
and decide for itself whether the plaintiff is bound under third party beneficiary
principles. Unlike a scope challenge, where the plaintiff merely argues “I did not
agree to arbitrate the merits of that claim,” a nonsignatory plaintiff contends “I did
not agree to arbitrate anything (including whether I agreed to arbitrate the merits
of a claim).” Thus, the court must retain jurisdiction to “assure itself that the
non-signatory has agreed to arbitrate at all.”375

AAA Rules did not come into play because Archer and White requested an injunction, and arbitration
agreement exempted “actions seeking injunctive relief.” Id. at 277; see also id. at 281 (“The plain language
incorporates the AAA rules—and therefore delegates arbitrability—for all disputes except those under
the carve-out.”).
372 Henry Schein, 139 S. Ct. at 529-31.
373 Jody James Farms, JV v. Altman Grp., Inc., 547 S.W.3d 624, 632 n.21 (Tex. 2018) (quoting
In re Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc., 293 S.W.3d 182, 193 (Tex. 2009) (Hecht, J., dissenting)); cf. VRG
Linhas Aereas S.A. v. MatlinPatterson Global Opportunities Partners II L.P., 717 F.3d 322, 326 n.2
(2d Cir. 2013) (opining that “whether the parties agreed to arbitrate in the ﬁrst place is [a question]
only a court can answer, since in the absence of any arbitration agreement at all, ‘questions of
arbitrability’ could hardly have been clearly and unmistakably given over to an arbitrator”).
374 Rau, supra note 101, at 17 (emphasis omitted in part); see also supra text accompanying
notes 101–102.
375 WTA Tour, Inc. v. Super Slam Ltd., 339 F. Supp. 3d 390, 399 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 2018); see also
Riley v. BMO Harris Bank, N.A., 61 F. Supp. 3d 92, 98 n.2 (D.D.C. 2014) (“[T]he [c]ourt must still
determine whether [p]laintiff is estopped from avoiding arbitration, even if the question of arbitrability
must be submitted to the arbitrator per the language of the loan agreements.”). In fact, even courts in
jurisdictions that refused to adopt the “wholly groundless” exception for matters of “pure scope” before
Henry Schein nevertheless recognized that “delegation provision[s] can apply only to those parties who
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Likewise, although the law is a tangled mess, the same principle should
extend to nonsignatory defendants. Initially, the First and Second Circuits held
that nonparties could enforce a delegation clause in another firm’s contract and
ask the arbitrator to determine whether the nonparty was entitled to compel
arbitration.376 But those cases featured nonsignatories who truly stood in the
shoes of the original contracting party: a bankruptcy assignee and a clear-cut
successor-in-interest.377 Outside of those unique circumstances, a delegation
provision should not permit an arbitrator to decide whether plaintiffs must
arbitrate against nonsignatories.378 For one, a plaintiff in such a case denies that
she agreed to arbitrate any issue with the nonsignatory, including the threshold
matter of whether she agreed to arbitrate her substantive claims. As a judge in
the Southern District of New York recently put it:
To use the delegation clause to demand that arbitrators settle the question of
who are the parties to the agreement puts the proverbial cart—the question
of whether the arbitration agreement is valid—before the horse—whether a
non-signatory has anything to do with a contract it did not clearly sign.379

Moreover, allowing nonsignatory defendants to capitalize on delegation
clauses would open the door to a surreal hall of mirrors. No matter how
attenuated the connection between two entities, any party—from American
Airlines to Zenith Electronics—could enforce a delegation clause in a different
actually signed the agreement and manifested their desire to arbitrate arbitrability.” SBMH Grp.
DMCC v. Noadiam USA, LLC, 297 F. Supp. 3d 1321, 1326 (S.D. Fla. 2017).
376 Contec Corp. v. Remote Sol., Co., 398 F.3d 205, 209 (2d Cir. 2005); Apollo Computer, Inc.
v. Berg, 886 F.2d 469, 470-74 (1st Cir. 1989).
377 Nat’l Oilwell Varco, L.P. v. Sadagopan, No. 16-2261, 2018 WL 276364, at *3 (S.D. Tex.
Jan. 3, 2018).
378 See In re Toyota Motor Corp. Unintended Acceleration Mktg., Sales Practices, & Prod. Liab.
Litig., 838 F. Supp. 2d 967, 986 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (refusing to allow the arbitrator to decide an equitable
estoppel issue); Qpro Inc. v. RTD Quality Servs. USA, Inc., 761 F. Supp. 2d 492, 497 (S.D. Tex. 2011)
(reasoning that “whether a nonsignatory to an arbitration clause may enforce it against a signatory . . .
[i]s a matter for the court to decide”); First Am. Bulk Carrier Corp. v. Van Ommeren Shipping (USA)
LLC, 540 F. Supp. 2d 483, 485 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (holding that the arbitrator could not decide whether
the nonsignatory defendant was a successor-in-interest to the signatory because “there is much to be
said for determining who are the parties to the arbitration before the arbitrators hear the merits”); In
re Paragon Offshore PLC, 588 B.R. 735, 753 (Bankr. D. Del. 2018) (“[E]ven where express contractual
language exists to show an intent to arbitrate questions of arbitrability, the [c]ourt must consider
whether the ‘parties’ at issue fall within the scope of the delegation language.”); Elgohary v. Herrera,
405 S.W.3d 785, 793 (Tex. Ct. App. 2013) (“[E]vidence of a successor, assigns, or affiliates clause in the
contract between the signatories is not evidence that the non-signatory intended that an arbitrator
decide whether the non-signatory was bound under the contract’s provisions about successors.”). But
see Rainbow Cinemas, LLC v. Consol. Constr. Co. of Ala., 239 So. 3d 569, 577 (Ala. 2017) (allowing
nonsignatories to enforce delegation clause); cf. Brittania-U Nigeria, Ltd. v. Chevron USA, Inc., 866
F.3d 709, 715 (5th Cir. 2017) (same).
379 Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA v. Stucco Sys., LLC, 289 F. Supp. 3d 457, 466
(S.D.N.Y. 2018).

686

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 168: 633

party’s contract and have the arbitrator decide who belongs in the private
forum.380 Thus, cases with nonsignatory defendants raise “question[s] of
‘relational sufficiency’” that are “for the [c]ourt, not the arbitrator, to resolve.381
Finally, survival issues are also nondelegable. When a plaintiff argues that
the container contract has expired, she calls into question whether her assent
to arbitrate any matter whatsoever—both the merits and arbitrability—has
likewise expired. Even when the underlying agreement includes both a
survivorship provision and a delegation clause, an arbitrator cannot make this
call.382 Indeed, survivorship is the kissing cousin of the nonarbitrable issue of
whether a plaintiff manifested assent to the container contract. Just as only a
judge can decide whether consent emerged from the ether, only a judge can
decide whether it evaporated.383

380 Cf. Dental Implants & Biomaterials S.L. v. Keystone Dental, Inc., No. 12-1158, 2012 WL
12896195, at *3 (D. Minn. July 3, 2012) (“[A defendant] could not, for example, institute arbitration
against a company with whom it never had a contract at all and then insist that only an arbitrator
could decide that there was no contract between the two parties.”).
381 Gerszberg v. Li & Fung (Trading) Ltd., 215 F. Supp. 3d 282, 288 (S.D.N.Y. 2016).
382 See N.Y. Dialysis Servs., Inc. v. N.Y. State Nurses Ass’n, 262 F. Supp. 3d 96, 102 (S.D.N.Y.
2017) (“[W]hether the agreement to arbitrate has likewise expired is a pure question of the continued
operation vel non of the contract itself (as opposed to the scope of the arbitration clause) and hence
a question . . . left to the courts.”). A federal judge in Minnesota has correctly held that inﬁnite
language does not change this calculus because it cannot manufacture agreement where it otherwise
does not exist. See Dental Implants & Biomaterials S.L., 2012 WL 12896195, at *3 n.3 (“The fact that
the arbitration provision ‘survive[s] any termination or expiration’ of the agreement . . . does not
mean that any dispute between the parties must for-evermore be arbitrated.” (citation omitted)).
383 Occasionally, a case features both a matter of “pure scope” and an “agreement challenge.” For
example, in Tillman v. Hertz Corp., No. 16-4242, 2016 WL 5934094, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 11, 2016), Rico
Tillman’s mother rented a car from Hertz on January 6, 2016 and listed Tillman’s phone number as her
emergency contact. Tillman then rented vehicles from Hertz on January 18 and January 25, 2016. Id.
Hertz’s customer agreement mandated arbitration for “any aspect of the relationship or communications
between us” and also included a delegation provision. See Memorandum in Support of Defendant the
Hertz Corporation’s Motion to Compel Arbitration and to Dismiss, or, in the Alternative, to Stay
Pending Arbitration at 3, Tillman, 2016 WL 5934094 (No. 16-4242). Tillman’s mom failed to return her
car on time, and Hertz made several automated phone calls to Tillman in February. Tillman, 2016 WL
5934094, at *1. When Tillman sued under the TCPA, Hertz sought to invoke the contracts he had signed
in mid-January, which Hertz claimed contained an arbitration clause and delegation provision to which
Tillman had agreed. A federal court in Illinois rejected this request:

The instant dispute arises not from the contractual relationship between plaintiﬀ and
defendant, but rather from the contract between plaintiﬀ ’s mother and defendant—a
contract to which plaintiﬀ was not a party. Therefore, even if plaintiﬀ did enter into
valid arbitration agreements when he rented cars from defendant, those arbitration
agreements would not apply to a dispute regarding plaintiﬀ ’s mother’s rental car.
Id. at *2. Nestled within this reasoning are two separate conclusions: that (1) Tillman was not a party
to the contract his mother had signed (an “agreement challenge”) and (2) that assuming Tillman had
agreed to the arbitration clauses in the mid-January rental contracts, those arbitration agreements
would not apply to a dispute regarding plaintiﬀ ’s mother’s rental car (a matter of “pure scope”).
Under my thesis, the court would decide the ﬁrst issue, leaving the second for the arbitrator.
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Table 1: Delegation of Challenges to Arbitration
Challenge

Nature of Assertion

Delegable?

Scope

Plaintiff agreed to arbitrate arbitrability,
but denies that she agreed to
arbitrate a specific claim.

Yes

Nonsignatory
Plaintiﬀ

Plaintiff denies that she agreed
to arbitrate anything (including
arbitrability).

No

Nonsignatory
Defendant

Plaintiff denies that she agreed
to arbitrate anything (including
arbitrability) with this defendant.

No

Survival

Plaintiff agreed to arbitrate arbitrability
with this defendant, but argues that
this agreement expired.

No

Therefore, despite Henry Schein’s categorical statements, courts retain
jurisdiction over a wide variety of disputes over scope arbitrability. Even the
one-two punch of the broadest possible delegation and arbitration provisions
cannot pass the baton to the arbitrator to decide whether a plaintiﬀ agreed to
arbitrate a matter. Ultimately, contracts cannot validate themselves.
CONCLUSION
Until recently, an agreement to arbitrate “any claim or controversy arising
out of or relating to” the container contact was “the very paradigm of a broad
arbitration clause.”384 But now, through inﬁnite provisions, consumers,
employees, medical patients, and their relatives are supposedly assenting “to
arbitrate all claims that could ever arise” against a defendant and its allies.385
Moreover, companies are trying to use inﬁnite language in tandem with
delegation clauses to almost completely opt out of the court system—a trend
that will only accelerate after Henry Schein.
384 Woodville Enter., LLC v. Kokosing Materials, Inc., 94 N.E.3d 1053, 1056-57 (Ohio Ct.
App. 2017) (citation omitted).
385 Savage v. Citibank, N.A., No. 14-03633, 2015 WL 2214229, at *3 (N.D. Cal. May 12, 2015).
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This Article has explained why many of these efforts should fail. First,
infinite language is not enforceable when it tries to fabricate contractual consent.
Second, § 2 of the FAA does not provide safe harbor for arbitration provisions
that govern lawsuits that are disconnected from the parties’ agreement. Third,
delegation clauses cannot cover questions about whether arbitration clauses
apply to nonsignatories or last forever. Recognizing these parameters will
prevent private dispute resolution from becoming a black hole that swallows an
ever-expanding swath of the civil justice system.

